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United States National Will: A Psychoanalytic Theory

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The work addresses the problem of the concept of national will. Present concepts are held to be inadequate because they arbitrarily separate national will from the political decision-making process and because they are psychologically unsound. As a result the concepts are of limited value in understanding the way in which national will is expressed in the United States.

An hypothesis: "United States national will is the collective intent of the group empowered to decide policy on a given issue" is proposed. Utilizing the concepts of group psychodynamics developed by W. R. Bion, a model for United States national will is constructed from the hypothesis. The model requires that issues be defined in relation to the psychodynamics of the group involved with the particular issue. It shows how changes in the issue can result from communications within the group or from communications to outsiders. Such changes in issue are held to produce a new group, whether or not the group membership changes. The model also shows that national will becomes the expression of the decision made by the group, provided the group controls the resources necessary to enact its decision.


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UNITED STATES NATIONAL WILL:

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ABSTRACT

The work addresses the problem of the concept of national will. Present concepts are held to be inadequate because they arbitrarily separate national will from the political decision-making process and because they are psychologically unsound. As a result the concepts are of limited value in understanding the way in which national will is expressed in the United States. An hypothesis: "United States national will is the collective intent of the group empowered to decide policy on a given issue" is proposed. Utilizing the concepts of group psychodynamics developed by W. R. Bion, a model for United States national will is constructed from the hypothesis. The model requires that issues be defined in relation to the psychodynamics of the group involved with the particular issue. It shows how changes in the issue can result from communications within the group or from communications to outsiders. Such changes in issue are held to produce a new group, whether or not the group membership changes. The model also shows that national will becomes the expression of the decision made by the group, provided the group controls the resources necessary to enact its decision.

When this model is applied to two case studies in recent American foreign policy action, the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban missile crisis, it fits the data available. Also, the model allows

for more complete understanding of how these foreign policy actions related to public opinion at the time than do other concepts of national will.

The new concept has implications for policy-makers and suggests areas for further study which might lead to more effective leadership of public opinion.

DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF

GEORGE E. RINKER, M.D.

PREFACE

In a complex and technical modern world the connection between a citizen's opinion and the policies enacted in his name by his nation is not as clear as it might have been during the time of the New England town meeting. Direct representation has given way to indirect representation and dilution of individual opinion into a greater and greater pool of public opinion as the population increases.

Furthermore, direct confrontation with one's elected representative has become a rare thing. Consequently, an individual's ability to directly influence those who speak for him is greatly reduced except through the all-or-nothing effect of his vote at election.

Conversely, the elected official, even though he may conscientiously try to know the desires of his constituents, finds it difficult to reach a valid consensus. The problems of gathering opinions are complicated by the vast number and increasing technicality of issues about which opinions may be held. Through the magic of the electronic media, the official may educate his people on the issues and his views on them, but the communication is essentially one-way. The "public" is converted to a "mass."¹

¹C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford Press, 1956), pp. 302-303.

Nevertheless, the idea of "the will of the people" still predominates in a democratic society. During World War II an important policy-making official of the United States told Alexander Leighton, who was then advising the Government on behavioral studies of the Japanese, that a negotiated end to the war with Japan might be achieved if the United States could convince the Japanese that their surrender would not mean the end of their Emperor. However, the official maintained that a project to accomplish that end could not be undertaken because the American people would not accept a Japanese surrender which left the Emperor in Japan.² If the premise is correct that a negotiated surrender could have been achieved, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki could have been avoided. The atomic holocaust, then, resulted in part from official understanding of the will of the American people.

What is most ironic and at the same time crucial to the question addressed herein is that, despite the unconditional surrender of Japan, the Emperor was left in Japan. How could this have happened if the will of the American people was against it? Two answers are possible. The first is that the official was wrong in his assessment of American national will. The second is that public opinion somehow does not translate directly into national policy as it is enacted. In other words, national will may be better understood as something other than a direct expression of the opinions of the American people.

²Alexander H. Leighton, Human Relations in a Changing World (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1949), p. 103.

Surely an understanding of the nature of national will is important. The example above illustrates that those who make policy are influenced by what they believe to be the opinions of the American people. Moreover, the example shows that the policy-maker's concept of how public opinion is translated into national policy influences his actions. Clearly, the official in this example believed that it mat-tered what American public opinion was because he believed that it would somehow control the expression of policy. Thus, his concept of national will, as well as his assessment of public opinion, dictated his action.

The study of the nature of national will involves the broad disciplines of psychology, sociology, political science, and philosophy. More particularly it includes the studies of group psychodynamics, political decision-making, public opinion gathering and evaluating, and communications theory. The broadness of the subject alone dictates that the work of a single investigator will be partial and incomplete. One hopes that a special depth of grounding in at least one area, namely, group psychodynamics, will enable the researcher to make some significant contribution to the understanding of national will.

Additional constraints of time and available resources further limit the scope of the study. As a result, only United States national will in the post-World War II era is examined.

Some problems of research further impinge upon the study. Workers in the various disciplines involved generally address concerns in their own argot. Questions raised by their findings are not pursued

because they relate only peripherally to their own areas, though they may appear to be critically important to the study of national will.

Also, state-of-the-art problems limit the research. Particularly vexing is that the study of public opinion assessment seems to be still in the phase of defining the problem. As a result, the studies of meaningful public opinion have yet to establish data bases.

Therefore, this study does not provide the last word on the question of national will. Hopefully, however, it raises some important questions and suggests directions for further research.

R. O. B.

INTRODUCTION

Existing concepts of national will as an element of the total United States national power are unsatisfactory because they invoke vague concepts, make arbitrary distinctions between national will and the political processes, fail to elucidate the role of public opinion in the expression of national will and offer little framework in which to understand United States actions. This research addresses these shortcomings. In Chapter I the present concepts of national will and the role of public opinion are examined, and a new hypothesis of national will is proposed. In Chapter II a model for national will is developed from the new hypothesis. In Chapters III and IV the model is applied to two case studies. Finally, in Chapter V conclusions and recommendations for further study are offered.

The two case studies analyzed in Chapters III and IV are episodes in American foreign policy history which involved the commitment of armed forces by or with the direct support of the United States. They are commonly known as the "Bay of Pigs Invasion" and the "Cuban Missile Crisis." They occurred within two years of each other, during April 1961 and October 1962. In addition to having in common military actions and the island of Cuba, the episodes share other aspects. The same basic groups, with significant changes, were involved in both

decisions. Both episodes occurred within a framework of American concern about the revolutionary government of Cuba and changing ideas about the Soviet threat to the United States. The same President presided over both actions.

Some important differences between the two episodes also existed. First, the groups which made the policy decisions were somewhat different in both membership and activity. Further, the first episode was undertaken entirely in secret and is generally considered to have been the result of a poor decision which exposed the United States to great risk and had a disastrous outcome. The second is thought to be an excellent action, the product of a good decision which averted great danger and had an excellent outcome.

These two cases are examined in the light of the new hypothesis of national will offered here. The scope of this work limited the number of cases examined and, to some degree, the detail of the examinations.

Although this writer believes the hypothesis is broad enough to encompass domestic and long-term expressions of national will, as well as short-term foreign ones, these cases were chosen because they are examples of the most dramatic projections of national power, involving, as they do, military actions toward foreign countries. Also, since the two cases may be considered to represent specific episodes in a two-year span of national policy actions toward Cuba, some insight may be gained into the applicability of the hypothesis to such longer-term policies.

The hypothesis proposed suggests that long-term commitments of national will may be better understood as a series of short-term commitments that are related to ever-renewing issues.

Obviously, the study examines only United States national will. Nonetheless, the hypothesis does appear to have more general application.

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CHAPTER I

THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL WILL

Concepts

Comprehensive concepts of the development and articulation of national policy, particularly foreign policy, encompass at least three general ideas. The first is an operational environment in which actors perceive and generate the issues. The second is a decision-making process into which issues and actors enter and from which a policy is formulated. The third is a resources environment from whence comes the power to implement the policy formulated. This latter environment also contains forces which impinge upon the operational environment and the decision-making process in a variety of ways that color perceptions and influence action. These ideas in various forms are a part of the work of such writers in political science as Gabriel Almond, Michael Brecher, and James Rosenau.¹

Each of the preceding ideas, taken singly or together, is an area of interest and study for foreign policy advocates and students of


¹Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960); M. Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 1-17; and J. N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy As an Issue-Area," in Domestic Sources of Foreign Power, ed. by J. N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 11-50.

foreign policy as well as strategists, sociologists, economists, and others. The end product of all this, national policy, affects all areas of national concern and interest. An understanding of the components and processes involved is sought in order to effectively plan, support, and predict national policy and its results. The complexity of interrelationships, the imprecise nature of concepts, and the difficulties in obtaining meaningful measurements often frustrate these efforts.

Perhaps the most complex, least clear, and most difficult of these areas to measure is that of the resources environment. This is understood generally to be the nation at large with all of its manpower, material wealth, and other sources of power and the systems which deny or make them available for the implementation of national policy. Some explanation of the elements of such national power are the demographic, the geographic, the economic, the military, the organizational-administrative, and the historical-psychological-sociological elements of power.² Combining the demographic and geographic elements as the geographic element, renaming the organizational-administrative element the political element, and renaming the historical-psychological-sociological element the national will, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) has produced a model for the projection of national power which is reflected in Figure 1.³

²Frederick H. Hartmann, The Relations of Nations (New York: Macmillan Co., 1962), p. 46.

³Wm. Stofft, "National Will: Key Element of Power," R/N 5104 Course Outline (USACGSC, SY 1974-75), p. LP 1-2.



Source: Wm. Stofft, "National Will: Key Element of Power," Course Outline (USACGSC, SY 1974-75), p. 2.

Fig. 1.--Projection of National Power

Four of the elements of power can be reasonably well understood from their names. The fifth, national will, is perhaps not so clear a concept, but it has been aptly defined as "what has been their [the people's] past experience as a nation-state, how do they look at life, and how cohesive is their society."⁴ The definition is descriptive rather than dynamic and, although it suggests measurements which might be made, it gives little clue as to how the element interacts in the projection of national power.

National will as an element of power has been defined also as "the psychosocial element [which] consists of the combined individual and social attributes of a nation's people which influence the nation's performance."⁵ No further explanation of the workings of this element is offered except the suggestion that it is a composite of a stable "national character" and a volatile "national morale."⁶

More on the above two concepts is offered shortly. In the meantime, Stofft says:

National will consists of those intangible, non-material aspects and factors in the society of a nation-state which affect resolve or national determination to have and use power and which are clearly not the military, political, economic or geographic elements of power but which can affect the nature of these other four elements of power.⁷

⁴Hartmann, p. 40.

⁵Air War College Associate Programs, Vol. I: Bases of Power and Conflict, Course Code: 0004 01 C04 7071, 6th ed. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: U.S. Air Force, Air University, May 1970), Chap. 4: "The Elements of Power--Psychosocial and Economic," p. 1.

⁶Ibid. ⁷Stofft, p. LP 1-7.

This definition is perhaps the most comprehensive available. Yet it points up the vagueness of a concept described as "intangible" and "non-material" and defined by exclusion. It also suggests the importance of national will as an element which can affect the nature of the other elements of power.

More helpful is the USACGSC description of the components of national will. The culture of a nation and its institutions are said to contribute to it. Nationalism is "the psychological energy which supports the system."⁸ Presumably there must be nationalism for national will to exist.

For nationalism, there must be a feeling on the part of the people that they possess group values. . . . [T]hey must have a common outlook at least to this extent: that they agree they are a distinct group who ought to be governed by themselves and as a group.⁹

This definition, while clear, does not appear to offer much upon which to base planning, support, and prediction of national power because it is so fundamental as not to distinguish either characteristics or processes.

Further components of nationalism, and therefore of national will, are national character, national morale, and national style.¹⁰ National character appears to be a major interest of those who speak of national will. National character is ill-defined, however, and its role in the production of national will is confusing. Anthropologists have labored with the problem of the substance and description of the

⁸Stofft, LP 1-18.

⁹Hartmann, p. 30.

¹⁰Stofft, pp. 30-34.

character of nations. They have produced some impressive descriptions of typical citizens of given nations. Yet at best they have produced statistical profiles that are accurate in general but not in the specific.¹¹ Indeed, speaking of the problems of techniques of investigation which could produce "reasonable empirical validity, [no] anthropologist feels comfortable in making such a claim for his capacity to encompass the culture of any modern nation."¹² Perhaps one should speak of "cultures" of a modern nation. It would seem that the breadth of the society of the United States allows for a wide range of life styles and cultures, all of which are supportable in a nation with such a broad political and economic base. Still:

There is no question that [a study of national characters] goes a long way in shedding a rational light on the major attributes of what one may expect in the main from Hindus, Chinese and Americans as people.¹³

Nonetheless, "what one may expect in the main" is not necessarily of predictive value. Also, the dynamic connection among national character, national will, and the projection of national power remains unclear. Stofft suggests that forces and trends which may be subsumed as national style and national morale effect this connection.¹⁴

¹¹D. M. Potter, "The Quest for National Character," in The Character of Americans, ed. by M. McGiffert (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1970), p. 29.

¹²E. Adamson Hoebel, "Anthropological Perspectives on National Character," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 370 (March 1967):5.

¹³Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁴Stofft, p. LP 1-30.

While national character may change gradually with the evolution of a society, national style fluctuates more currently. It defines the limits of a nation's behavior. National style, the product of a nation's recent history of actions in domestic and international affairs, is affected by immediate ideas of who is and who is not a friendly nation and other current ideas about important relationships. To the degree to which this history and these concepts can be properly evaluated, national style is said to afford predictability.

It is difficult to understand, however, how any information pertinent to national style could have predicted, or would even now explain, an incursion of United States troops into Cambodia in 1970 during an avowed trend to draw down the scope of the war. Nor does it seem that national style would shed much light upon the United States supported invasion of Cuba in 1961. These actions seem to be clearly beyond the limits of acceptable behavior of the times for the United States. It may be that these actions were the product of a process that did not involve the national will as it is so far understood. These actions appear to have been the result of processes of decision-making which involved a few people who were empowered to implement the decisions as a result of the political structure of the nation.

An important failing of the present concept of national will may therefore be that it makes an arbitrary distinction between the social-psychological processes and the political processes in the United States, particularly those processes which may be part of a decision-

making structure not set out by law. That is, national will is conceived as a resource only and not as a dynamic expression of the decision-making process as well.

Critical to the implementation of national will in the present concept is the idea of national morale which is defined as "a state of mind . . . a willingness of a large percentage of the public to put the nation's welfare above its own."¹⁵ This idea poses several problems. First, how large a percentage of the public is required to support the national will? A majority? If so, is it a majority of all the people or only of those who can vote? Is it a majority of those who are adversely affected by a given policy, such as draft-aged men, or is it perhaps a near-unanimity of those affected who effect national will? On the other hand, maybe it is only a majority of those with the power to enforce conditions which adversely affect some of the public, for example, the courts in the case of draft-aged men. Or, perhaps what is required to effect the national will is only the support of those who control the economic or material resources which will be needed to implement the policy or which resources may be threatened by the results of policy.

Surely, in times of national emergency which are recognized by the public to be emergencies, individuals will make personal sacrifices. However, it seems a sound psychological principle that these sacrifices will be made because the alternative, not to make the sacrifices, would

¹⁵Stefft, p. LP 1-30.

have dire consequences and not because of any "state of mind" of a large percentage of the population.

Also, there is no clear understanding of why national morale is required for the implementation of national policy. Nor is it apparent how this national morale interacts with the decision-makers and implementors of policy to cause implementation.

The preceding discussion suggests that the present concept of national will is weak for two reasons. First, it arbitrarily excludes important parts of the political structure. Second, it postulates as necessary an operant force, national morale, which appears psychologically unsound in concept. It may also be that national will fails as a planning and predicting concept because it does not offer any measurable attributes.

Public Opinion

Although authors of the present concept make no clear link between national will and public opinion, it seems there must be one and that measurement of aspects of public opinion are indicated to elucidate the national will. The vote might seem to be the most direct expression of individual will. It requires an interest sufficient to motivate the act of voting and a will to make a commitment. Speaking on "the will to believe," William James emphasized the importance of the "liveness" of an issue, which is not an intrinsic property of the issue but is related to the individual vis-à-vis the issue. Liveness is "measured by the willingness to act. The maximum liveness is willingness to act

irrevocably."¹⁶ This early idea of the intensity of personal meaning the individual connects to a specific issue, measured by willingness to act, is critical to the understanding of any idea of collective will and is further developed in this chapter.

The issue in most votes is the election of an official. As such, however, it only suggests the voter's opinion on issues related to the candidate. Roll and Cantril offer several examples of the way in which positions on current issues may or may not be attributed to a certain candidate and may or may not affect the vote for him.¹⁷ Furthermore, only intermittently do candidates stand for election, but many issues come and go in the interim. How, then, is public opinion to be measured and how does it manifest its effect in the meantime?

All public officials receive mail, and most periodic publications receive and publish letters from readers. These are used in a variety of ways to measure public interest and opinion. Obviously, such spontaneous productions come from their authors' involvement and will to act (at least to the degree of writing a letter). Clearly, however, they do not represent a random cross-section. In fact, one study indicates that two-thirds of letters to editors come from 0.5 per cent of the reader population.¹⁸

¹⁶ Wm. James, The Will To Believe and Other Essays (New York: Dover Publishers, 1956), p. 3.

¹⁷ C. W. Roll and A. H. Cantril, Polls (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972), pp. 59-70 & 126.

¹⁸ J. N. Rosenau, The Attentive Public and Foreign Policy (New

Politicians often refer to their mail as well as to telephone and telegram messages as evidence of public opinion on an issue. The tabulations from such evidence vary in reliability as indicators of public opinion as a result of time elapsed from the announcement of an issue,¹⁹ who the recipient is, and the accuracy of classification and counting. William Moyers reported that while he was working at the White House, his wife's call to ask when he would be home for dinner was recorded as a favorable response to a recent television announcement by the President.²⁰

Public opinion polls are emerging as a source of information on the thoughts and feelings of the American people. So much is their output in demand by politicians and public officials that polls have been called "the fifth estate."²¹ George Gallup is an ardent supporter of public opinion polls as an important part of the democratic process which can help to separate the candidate from the issues,²² although he is not clear on how they accomplish this separation or for whom.

Allowing that polls can produce valuable information, one must recognize problems associated with their employment. These are problems

Brunswick, N. J.: Princeton University Center for International Studies, 1968), p. 3.

¹⁹ According to Roll and Cantril, p. vii, unusually strong early trends tend to reverse as the public is made aware of the volume of communications expressing an opinion that is not shared.

²⁰ Roll and Cantril, p. viii. ²¹ Roll and Cantril, p. 3.

²² George Gallup, A Guide to Public Opinion Polls (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 3.

of accuracy, integrity, interpretation, and the relationship of their product to formulation of national policy. The simpler technical problems of polling, that is, obtaining adequate sample and a good cross-section, have been fairly well overcome by standardized methods although problems are still present in surveys which involve special ethnic groups, for example. Problems of inaccurate polling can still be traced to the use of the barometer approach, which samples only certain "bell-wether" populations. Also, careless wording and sequencing of questions can produce skewed results.²³ Experienced pollsters avoid these distortions.

Favorable polls may be employed to stimulate publicity and thereby increase "investments" by contributors. Because of this, pressure for favorable returns results in unscrupulous pollsters offering their services while guaranteeing a favorable return or offering to "leak" unfavorable results of a poll done for an opponent.²⁴

Television stations and publications frequently conduct "spot polls" and "instant polls" that are primarily designed to increase viewer and reader interest. Their very provocative and suggestive questions often seem almost to create issues. Always the results are of questionable accuracy and value.²⁵

²³Roll and Cantril, pp. 2, 79, & 107.

²⁴Roll and Cantril, pp. 12-13 & 23.

²⁵Leo Bogart, Silent Politics: Polls and the Awareness of Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1972), pp. 22-23.

The public opinion measured by the polls is not the public opinion of historical concept: "a state of mind, diffuse, shapeless and shifting as a cloud . . . a natural force."²⁶ Nevertheless, the nature of poll-taking treats opinion as if it were static, definable, and measurable. It becomes "easy to succumb to the notion that the measurements represent reality rather than a distorted, dim approximation of reality."²⁷ The meaning of such measurements is often uncertain. For example, the intensity of feeling with which a respondent holds his opinion is not always elicited. "No opinion" can signify complete indifference or agonizing doubt. The interview itself, acting as a catalyst, often produces quick responses from a person and results in opinions he hardly could have, such as those favoring the enactment of a fictitious "metallic metals act" or opinions he would likely reconsider if he thought through the consequences. An example of the latter is to be found in a 1970 CBS poll which suggested that a majority of Americans would do away with the Bill of Rights.²⁸

It is not always clear that respondents mean that the opinions they express would be translated into action if it were possible. To evaluate the meaning of poll results requires such an assessment.²⁹ This is consistent with James's idea (see pp. 9-10 above) that for opinion to become will, with the commitment to act, requires that the issue have liveness for the individual.

²⁶Ibid., p. 14.

²⁷Ibid., p. 14.

²⁸Ibid., p. 17.

²⁹Ibid., p. 19.

In this regard, Bogart has suggested that there are three kinds of changes in public opinion. Changes in broad secular trends, the first kind, reflect the currents of history and "are of greater predictive value when they concern broad aspects of human relations than when they involve responses to specific events."³⁰ Changes related to major ongoing political developments, the second kind, are more apparent but less gradual than the first kind. Changes which come as short-term reactions to news of the moment, the third kind, are the easiest to measure by polling methods but are difficult to predict in relation to events which might be expected to produce shifts in public opinion. Changes in the last category are easily influenced by drama, speeches and actions of respected leaders, and public perception of the importance of an issue.³¹

Public opinion, then, is difficult to define, measure, or predict. Even if it can be fairly well understood, the way in which it becomes expressed as national will remains unclear. In fact, it is not at all certain that public opinion is the source of national will as it is expressed in national policy.

Opinion and Policy

As noted above, Bogart has suggested one relationship between policy and opinion, that opinion changes sharply as a shortrun reaction to newsworthy issues. He further implicates the actions of respected

³⁰Ibid., pp. 75-76.

³¹Ibid., pp. 76 & 83-84.

leaders in influencing this change. Drama connected with the issue seems to affect the change in opinion, too.

The mass media carry the messages of leaders to the people. They also can provide drama with full-color, animated, live coverage of events. The media, then, likely influence and possibly even create the public opinion reaction to issues and events. Certainly they may effect this in concert with a leader who wishes to make an issue a matter of public concern.

The media also may essentially create the issue through the power to select what is news and to link it together to produce the "big story." With news begetting news as correspondents everywhere begin to report topical information, the result is a "takeoff effect." Further, since the media generally report only one "big story" at a time and the reporting of it is circular, the intensity rises and falls with new input until the story is played out.³²

The interaction of leaders, events, media, and public opinion developing intensity about one issue may be the vehicle through which, by accident or design, public opinion is built into national will on a given issue. Involvement may be as short-lived as the news; or, it may wax and wane with the development of new information which alters the issue and creates the possibility of new involvement.

³²B. C. Cohen, "Mass Communication and Foreign Policy," in Domestic Sources of Foreign Power, ed. by J. N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 195 & 203-204.

Remarkably, the assessment of public opinion itself may become a part of the input to the renewing issue. Politicians, learning of a shift in public opinion, may decide to act upon this information and, in so doing may create a conflict with policy-makers, which conflict then becomes an issue.

Opinions, elicited by polls and taken up by politicians, become commitments from which it is difficult to escape, and "yesterday's perceptions govern tomorrow's expressions of the public mood."³³ When new input redefines the issue and another shift in public opinion is perceived, the public may be reported "confused" on the matter, and this "confusion" may become a matter of news. A case study of public opinion on the Vietnam war illustrates this phenomenon.³⁴

The preceding discussion suggests a way in which public opinion might interact with policy-makers if the issue becomes a matter of public concern and if policy-makers become involved. These two conditions, however, might not obtain. Certainly it is possible to imagine that an issue might be decided and implemented outside the public purview. Also, it is possible that policy-makers might choose to consider the input of information on public opinion immaterial, too uncertain to be of use, or important but not overriding. If the power to implement the policy lies with the policy-makers, the policy may be enacted and thus become the national will. President Nixon made much of his need to act on his own judgment regardless of the polls.³⁵ President Lincoln,

³³Bogart, p. 20.

³⁴Bogart, pp. 89-96.

³⁵Bogart, p. 48.

having taken a straw vote which went against him, is reported to have said to his advisors: "Seven 'nays,' one 'aye'; the ayes have it."³⁶

A leader can influence public opinion in many ways. "The Kennedy Experiment," for example, was a series of proposals and counter-proposals the Administration made to Soviet Russia. The proposals were given wide publicity although the goal was not so much to effect a change in international relations as to accustom the public to such dealings in order to gain wider options in dealing with the Russians.³⁷ Clearly, President Kennedy felt the need to mold public opinion, at least to the extent that it afforded him the "tacit permissiveness of silence."³⁸ It may be that apathetic public consent is what policymakers most often desire so they may pursue their work in peace.

Sometimes public opinion shifts quite automatically to support a commitment a leader has made. A Gallup poll reported 58 per cent opposition to sending troops to support Cambodia prior to the President's public announcement that it had been done. After the announcement, a second Gallup poll showed 59 per cent supported the action. Both polls, incidentally, also showed that 50 per cent believed the action would not shorten the war and might prolong it.³⁹ The issue seems to have changed from: "Is sending troops a good idea?" to: "Will I support the

³⁶N. L. Hill, Mr. Secretary of State (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 47.

³⁷Bogart, p. 51, citing Amatai Etzioni, "The Kennedy Experiment," Western Political Quarterly 20 (June 1967):361-80.

³⁸Bogart, p. 46.

³⁹Bogart, p. 92.

President?" At the time the answer to the latter was mostly "yes."

The Hypothesis

A better hypothesis of national will must not be based upon national morale, must include the political structure which is a part of policy-making, and must articulate the relationship between public opinion and the projection of national power. It should also offer some suggestions about the dynamics of national policy formulation. Further, the hypothesis would be valuable if it elucidated factors which might be used to analyze past cases and possibly to predict national policy formulations.

In its broadest terms the hypothesis proposed in this paper is: United States national will is a phenomenon of group dynamics which is issue-specific and timebound. The current political structure determines its expression. If it is understood that the political structure is the composition of the policy-making group, the hypothesis may be restated: United States national will is the collective intent of the group empowered to decide policy on a given issue.

CHAPTER II

A MODEL FOR NATIONAL WILL

Defining the Group

National will as a phenomenon of group dynamics may be further defined as the collective intent of the group empowered to decide an issue and enact national policy. To understand the phenomenon, the group must be understood.

Some issues of national policy are surely decided by one man. Sorensen has given some insight into decisions made personally by President Kennedy. For example, he described Kennedy as being intent upon arriving at the proper name for a new nuclear submarine.¹ The President personally undertook that decision because of his personal interests, and one can imagine decisions of greater moment which he might also have taken on personally.

Daily, bureaucrats, working alone within a framework of established policy, make decisions that are presumably of a routine nature. Occasionally, such decisions may prove to be of great importance to the nation, and hindsight may suggest that some of the questions should have been referred for more complete decision-making.

¹Theodore C. Sorensen, Decision-Making in the White House (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 13.

"Referred to whom?" one might ask. One answer would be that decisions of more than routine significance, particularly foreign policy decisions, are referred to a group of national decision-making "policy elites."² These elites are of four types:

- Political elites are the elected, the high appointed, and the party leaders.

- Administrative or bureaucratic elites are those who "enjoy special powers by virtue of their interest in and familiarity and immediate contact with particular policy problems."³

- Interest elites, both bureaucratic and elected, "enjoy powers in practice which are not formally recognized in the legal distribution of authority."⁴

- Communications elites are the owners and controllers of the mass media.

The concept of such elites deciding policy for the nation is not inconsistent with democracy in that there is a sort of continuum of elites and no "non-elites."⁵ This elite decision-making process

is the medium through which differing ideas about the world are affirmed or rejected as a basis for policy. . . . It is through this selective function that the political process can exercise an influence on both the content and the form of the policy.⁶

²Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), pp. 139-41.

³Ibid., p. 139.

⁴Ibid., p. 140.

⁵Ibid., p. 137.

⁶Warner R. Schilling, P. Y. Hammond, and G. H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 15-16.

The elite structure is characterized by a "large number of competing and autonomous groups." Underlying this is the "mass structure" composed of a "small, informed stratum, attentive to elite discussion and conflict" and "a much larger base normally ignorant of and indifferent to policy and policy-making."⁷ Therefore, the elite structure is distinct from the public at large. Its groups present varying opinions and interests which are in competition with each other to influence policy, and it is known to only a small segment of the American public.

Who are the members of this elite? Some members are suggested by the four elite types described above. They are the President, cabinet members, congressional leaders, presidential advisors, especially those with expertise in certain areas, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are lobbyists and possibly representatives of the press. Although membership varies from time to time, a list of all possible members of the elite would be long indeed.

Individuals might be members of the elite "by virtue of their interest and familiarity . . . with particular policy problems" or because they "enjoy powers in practice," as did Rev. Billy Graham during the Nixon Administration. Therefore, the issue often defines the elite members of a decision-making group and dictates the inclusion of institutional interest representatives, foreign area specialists, or technical specialists. Sometimes a presidential favorite is included in a

⁷Ibid., p. 19.

decision-making group on an issue unrelated to his position. President Kennedy, for example, made Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg party to many decisions that had nothing to do with labor questions.⁸

Sometimes, as in the initial formation of the elite group of policy-makers who were with President Truman during the time of the North Korean invasion, some elites will be included by accident or whim. The Secretary of the Army was at a party with the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs when the latter received a call alerting him of the invasion. The Secretary of the Army notified the Secretary of Defense, who otherwise would not have been immediately involved (though he surely would have been included soon). Also, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, after notifying the Secretary of State, took it upon himself to notify the Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs, a move which was to have far-reaching impact on the ultimate decision that group made.⁹

One kind of group whose collective intent might be the national will is a group of such policy elites acting to make a decision on a matter of foreign policy. It could be a standing group such as the Executive Committee of the President, or it could be an ad hoc group brought together to decide upon a particular issue. It might be a mixed group of some "regulars" and some "specialists."

⁸Sorenson, p. 27.

⁹Joseph de Rivera, The Psychological Dimensions of Foreign Policy (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1968), p. 208.

Whoever constitutes the decision-making group, the proof of its expression of national will is the enactment of policy. Therefore, this group must have the power to implement its collective intent in order to express national will. There are two general conditions under which it might not be able to do that. The first condition is that the issue is not a foreign policy issue. The second is that the group is not empowered to make the decision in the broader sense.

The issue may appear to be a foreign policy matter but may have domestic implications which arouse the general public, both the attentive and the unattentive public.

When foreign policy questions assume the aspect of immediate threat to the conduct of affairs, they break into the focus of attention and share the public consciousness with private and domestic affairs.¹⁰

Such a matter, presumably, was the question of "guns or butter" which arose during the escalation of the Vietnam conflict. President Johnson, who maintained that we could have guns and butter, parried the question; however, the issue returned to plague policy-makers in later years of the war.

Such issues as United States economic welfare or the continuation of the military draft, which may be directly affected by foreign policy decisions, can be expected to evoke at least a partial public participation. In some cases, however, the public needs only to perceive an issue as domestic to become involved. It is in this way that

¹⁰ Almond, p. 70.

ethical issues can be used to convert a foreign policy matter into a domestic issue, often through the efforts of the mass media. Perhaps the classic example is the Spanish-American War. The Hearst newspapers made the alleged atrocities of the Spanish Colonial Government a casus belli on humanitarian grounds. Bailey conceded that efforts toward a diplomatic resolution were thwarted by public pressure and finally a congressional declaration of war.¹¹ Far from being a typical expression of national will in accord with an American national character of humanitarianism, the war came after years of heavy journalistic pressure of the kind that came to be known as "Yellow Journalism." Also, the United States prosecuted the war not only in the Caribbean but in the far Pacific Philippines. The Philippines, of course, became a United States possession after the war.

Therefore, the American public was encouraged to believe that entering into a war with Spain was necessary to preserve American honor and to fulfill American obligations to defend the oppressed. However, the war was carried out in such a way as to satisfy the special mercantile interests lobbying for further expansion of American foreign markets. What, then, was the national will in this matter? Under the present concept, one would say that the national will was to fight a war with Spain to free Cuba. However, if one considers that the actions taken by the nation express the national will, the national will, at

¹¹Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Meredith Corp., 1969), pp. 453-64.

some time in the conflict, must have been to expand American markets and influence in the Pacific Ocean. The public as a whole may not have participated in the decisions which led to these actions. In fact, the issues of markets and influence may never have become a public issue. Nevertheless, in the proposed new concept of national will, these issues must have driven a group whose collective intent was expressed by the prosecution of the war in the Pacific.

Sometimes a member of the elite takes the issue to the public. Perhaps the President himself, in an effort to gain support for a measure, might make an effort to involve the public at large. Sorensen wrote that the President "must know how best and how often he can appeal to the public and when it is better left undisturbed."¹² This suggests that Presidents may view inclusion of the public into the decision-making group when it is not necessarily a risky business. However, it might be that a disaffected member or erstwhile member of the elite group might, for his own reasons, take an issue to the public.

Finally, an issue might very well arise of its own accord in the public sphere.

[These] anomic outbursts [are] more or less spontaneous penetrations by unorganized parts of society into the political system in the form of riots, demonstrations, assassinations, etc. . . . [and,] as in the domestic political system, latent discontent may be sparked by an incident and impinge upon the foreign policy system in the form of unpredictable and uncontrollable demands.¹³

¹²Sorensen, p. 32.

¹³M. Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 10.

Clearly, to the foreign policy analyst and planner, such direct actions by the public in the sphere of foreign affairs is an anomaly with unpredictable results.

So, a group of policy-making elites may not be able to express the national will if it is not strictly a foreign policy matter. The issue may involve the public by direct or perceived effects upon the domestic scene because some member of the elite chooses to involve the public or because the issue originates in the public sphere.

Additionally, the group may not be empowered to implement its collective intent. This limitation may be legal or practical, although, if a legal limitation can be practically ignored, it is probably not a limitation. Such a legal limitation was undoubtedly the intention of the War Powers Resolution that Congress passed. The resolution requires that Congress be informed of the President's deploying United States military elements in such a way that they are engaged in combat or are in danger of engagement. It further requires congressional approval to continue such engagements beyond a certain time limit. Whether this resolution will actually prevent the President (and his elites) from undertaking military action on his own initiative or will simply cause him to tailor the type of military effort he will undertake has yet to be tested. What is clear is that if the tenets of the resolution are obeyed, the policy group will be expanded to include Congress. There is, however, no requirement that Congress participate in the decision-making.


Practical limitations of the group's power are a result of lack of resources. Appropriations might limit the group's power in some instances, while the absence of a military draft might limit it in others. In these cases the group may have misperceived its own power or ignored the limitations. The limitation, however, is a material one, not simply a lack of will.

This empowering of the elite group has been called "political authorization." It is a kind of authorization that is defined by the conventions of the system and may or may not coincide with "legal authorization."¹⁴

Developing the Group

The group is defined as those individuals who are empowered to decide on an issue within their collective purview and to implement their collective intent. To develop a dynamic description of the group, a model will be of use. Figure 2 is an effort to illustrate a continuous flow effect in the development and implementation of a nation's foreign policy. Issues arising in an operational environment are colored by influences both external and internal to the decision-making organization, which may be more or less rigidly structured. These issues are communicated to a decision-making elite through all means, to include diplomatic channels, word-of-mouth, and mass media. Further, that elite colors the issues through the distortion of an "attitudinal

¹⁴Ibid., p. 11.



Adapted from: M. Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 4.

Fig. 2.--Foreign Policy Decision-Making

prism" which belongs to each individual and possibly to the group as a whole. Then, the issues are examined in the light of elite images that are colored by the same internal and external influences as are represented within the group. Next, the group formulates policy after considering several issue-areas. Finally, the policy is implemented by strategic (long-term) and tactical (short-term) actions.

However, the implementation, passed back through the influences which colored the original perceptions and evaluations, now changes "by varying degrees the operational environment and the elite images."¹⁵ Thus, at several levels within the system, new influences and, perhaps, new issues are generated.

To accommodate the hypothesis of national will, alterations in the model must be made (see Fig. 3). It is apparent from previous discussion that an action which changes the issue may also change the structure of the group. Different issues involve different interests, etc., and may even expand the group beyond the policy elite. What has not yet been discussed is that a change in the issue changes the dynamics of the group, always by direct effect and possibly by the indirect effect of changing the structure (membership) of the group. This dynamic change produces a new ad hoc group with each change of issue and results in a new "basic assumption" group.¹⁶ This is discussed in

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁶ Wilfred R. Bion, Experiences in Groups and Other Papers (London: Tavistock Publications, 1961), p. 170.




Fig. 3.--Model for National Will As the Expression of Group Dynamics

greater detail in the next section of this chapter.

The new issue which causes the development of a new basic assumption group changes the operational environment. The external and internal influences acting upon the group are either different or perceived as different by the dynamically changed group. The result, if the new issue arises at any time before the implementation of the decision, is that the decision-making process is short-circuited. Brecher's model assumes that new issues arise only at the completion of the policy-making and as a result of implementation of policy. The new model, however, allows for the development of a new issue and new group anywhere during the process by any of the events previously described.

An arrow emanating from the core of the actors labeled "elite" shows that the issue can be carried out of that core to involve larger groups composed of interests, institutions, or the part or all of the public. As it involves the larger group, however, it becomes, at least in part, a different issue which generates a new basic assumption group. Similarly, the issue can be communicated directly to one of the larger groups and then into the elite core. This is shown by the second arrow coming from the operational environment and passing into the actors. Alternatively, the communication may itself generate a new issue and group which changes the operational environment. This is shown by the arrow which turns back up into the operational environment. The arrow which turns up after the formulation of collective intent demonstrates that a new issue and group can be formed if, for reasons discussed

above, the decision-making group cannot implement its policy or if the mere communication of that policy results in a new issue.

This model, then, shows how national will can be viewed as a product of the decision-making process of various groups rather than as a sort of natural resource that springs forth to cause the nation to act or is tapped selectively by the nation's leaders when they deem it appropriate. It provides a dynamic model which ties national will to specific issues bound to specific groups, which, when empowered by authorization and in control of the necessary resources, can enact their intent. This enactment, by definition, is the national will.

The model also can be used to show how national will can change in relation to an ongoing situation. Rather than saying, for example, that the national will no longer supports the nation's military involvement in Vietnam, one can say that the issue has changed, and that the group empowered to enact the collective intent is no longer the elite group of the President and his military hierarchy, that it has come to include the Congress and perhaps even segments of the general public. Whether this came as a result of the implementation of policy or by the communication of issues to larger groups, or as a combination of these, is unclear. However, it is clear that the issues include congressional authority over waging war, economic priorities, and the willingness to be drafted as well as military intervention into Vietnam, which was accomplished initially without reference to these other issues.

Group Dynamics

Although the process described is a continuous flow, it may be considered that the groups formed have a beginning and an end. At least at any one time a group has a definable "culture: the result of its structure at the moment, the occupation it is pursuing, and its organization."¹⁷ These three might be equated to the membership of the group, the issue (in a decision-making group), and the formal and informal relationships of the members at the time. If it can be said that a group with a new culture is a new group, change in membership or issue, insofar as such change produces a new culture, produces a new group. Changes in relationships between the members may also produce a new group, as might occur when a member is elevated to chairmanship, for example.

Group culture and the individual contribute in ways that are not always conscious to a "group mentality" which is "the unanimous expression of the will of the group."¹⁸ This group mentality is the collective intent or national will of the present hypothesis.

Further, all groups meet for the same basic assumption, that is, the preservation of the group itself. This basic assumption is strongly reinforced by a machinery of intercommunication within the group. The basic assumption actually begins before the group ever meets. It requires active preservation of the group which can be effected in three general ways: dependence, pairing, and fight or flight. At any time

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 65.

that the basic assumption is operant, the group will be operating dynamically in one, or possibly a combination, of these ways. A group in such a state as a basic assumption group is labeled "Ba" with a letter "D" (dependent) or "P" (pairing) or "F" (fight or flight) appended as appropriate (e.g., BaD standing for "basic assumption group dependent").¹⁹

Since the group mentality reflects the dynamic state of the group, decisions made during BaD (dependent), for instance, can be expected to reflect the dependent condition of the group. Such decisions usually equate to the will of the leader of the group, the individual upon whom the group has formed its dependence. The leader may be the expected leader, such as the President, whose desire will then become the national will. However, it is worth noting that in therapeutic groups the BaD group chooses the most ill as leader and that among the general public groups led by "religious madmen" are cited as BaD. Also, the BaD group may substitute an historical record for a living leader and so become completely wedded to the status quo as portrayed in that history. The BaD group activity is marked by the stifling of independent thought and by "heresy-hunting."²⁰

The BaP (pairing) group functions to preserve the group through adherence to an idea of an unborn Messianic hope.²¹ Excess zeal colors the decisions of such groups. The decisions may relate to expectations

¹⁹Ibid., p. 63.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 85, 121, & 155.

²¹Ibid., p. 152.

of technical breakthroughs or dramatic changes in world conditions. The group activity is of the pairing off of members. The pairs support each other in the group and may work on their own concerns to the occasional exclusion of the rest of the group.

The BaF (fight or flight) group makes decisions in an aura of the need to protect the group from outside threats. The decisions are in terms of fighting the threat or taking flight to avoid it. All other recommendations are ignored.²²

The effect of the decision-making group's operating in Ba dynamics is to produce decisions which reflect those dynamics and which might be unexpected decisions given only the input of the issue and the operating environment. Even understanding the distortion of issues produced all along the course of the model in Figure 2 (page 28) might not be sufficient to explain a decision to go to war rendered by a group which was operating in a continuous BaF condition. It might well be that a politically beleaguered President and his group of elites would feel threatened as a group by the domestic political climate or by other influences and so only be able to think of fight or flight responses. The decision to go to war might appear to be one that would automatically involve a greater group through its domestic impact. If, however, the domestic issue were defined as a question of economic health, i.e., "guns or butter?," the domestic issue might be resolved in a greater group without changing the first decision, as, "guns and butter!"

²²Ibid., p. 152.

Without benefit of this perspective of group dynamics, unexpected decisions might be explained under other concepts of national will as being in consonance with some American value which outweighed other considerations. Thus a value of the right of self-determination for peoples of other nations might be used to explain a decision to employ United States military forces abroad in a case where a BaF group made the decision.

A President might in fact employ that very value to explain to his public why such a decision had been made. In this instance the President, as the leader of a BaD group, namely, the people of the United States, might be operating within the dynamic of the greater group by referring to an historical script, i.e., "Americans have always come to the aid of the oppressed." Therefore, the BaD group makes a decision to accept the status quo. Of course, a President who is a "strong" leader may simply state his decision to a public which is operating as a BaD group. He would obviously expect his decision to be followed.

The people, possibly inflamed by the mass media, may feel threatened by an outside force such as the communists and thus be functioning as a BaF group for whom only fight or flight decisions are acceptable. The President, as leader, will then find the decision to employ forces in consonance with the collective intent or group mentality of his country.

An alternative group dynamic is called the "Work Group." To

develop the work group out of the Ba group requires the development of a good "group spirit" which is reflected in a common purpose, a common recognition, the capacity to absorb and lose members, the absence of exclusive subgroups, a valuing of each member for his contribution, and an ability to face and cope with discontent.²³

The preceding conditions come about with varying ease and after varying lengths of time. Their development results from that same machinery of intercommunication which produces the basic assumption. Thus the structure and organization of the group can facilitate the development of the work group. Clearly defined roles and a clear scope of responsibilities contribute to the organization of a group in such a way as to speed the intercommunication required to produce the work group. Communications should be efficient to allow the characteristics of the group and its individual members to be demonstrable, and the group must come together enough to be able to hear each other "without having to shout." This is what Bion means by "common recognition."²⁴

It can be seen that standing operating procedures (SOP), which define roles and responsibilities, as well as the retention of members from group to group could facilitate the development of the work group. Presumably, however, the coupling of SOPs which produce only Ba groups and retention of members who manage to obstruct the development of the work group will have the opposite effect.

²³Ibid., pp. 25 & 98.

²⁴Ibid., p. 132.

It should also be evident that the difficulty of producing an effective machinery of intercommunications may preclude the possibility of the greater group, the public at large, from ever operating as a work group. Leaders probably recognize intuitively the time and effort involved in producing such a mass group is too much. Therefore, the public responds primarily as a Ba group even when leaders might prefer it otherwise. The effective leader may have to accept this, and, when he feels compelled to involve the public at large, will present the issue or his decision in a context appropriate to what he perceives to be the Ba group dynamic of the public at the time. Thus, the leader who reads the public opinion polls or letters to the editor is intuitively determining the current Ba of the public rather than plumbing the public "will." He does this to determine when and how to present an issue to the public so that it will be in consonance with the prevailing Ba. Naturally, through press releases and other communications to the public, he may, in the meantime, be encouraging the development of a specific Ba. President Roosevelt's repeated use of a poll in the years before World War II might have been such a ploy. The question asked in that poll was: "Do you think President Roosevelt has gone too far in his policies of helping Britain, or not far enough?"²⁵

The common purpose of the work group, of course, is not the basic assumption related to self-preservation. Rather, it is the

²⁵C. W. Roll and A. H. Cantril, Polls (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972), p. 147.

elaboration of information and the development of a solution. The work group is compelled to employ science "no matter how rudimentary a form."²⁶ Within the intellectual limitations of its members and the limitations of the availability of information, then, the work group will perform some sort of analysis of courses of action and will arrive at a decision.²⁷

The model developed (Fig. 3, page 30) is applied to the case studies presented in Chapters III and IV. The general areas examined are group structure and group dynamics.

²⁶Bion, p. 169.

²⁷Irving Janis, in Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), has made a study of the kind and quality of those analyses as affected by group dynamics.

CHAPTER III

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, 1961: INVASION

Introduction

The case of the United States and Cuba, 1961, can be viewed from the following four perspectives:

- The history of relations between the two countries.
- The leadership of opinion toward Cuba in the United States.
- The measure of United States public opinion toward Cuba.
- The activities of the policy group.

The first perspective, history of relations between the United States and Cuba, should provide information about the American character as reflected in United States actions toward Cuba. It should also reveal trends in such actions and should develop aspects of United States national style in relation to Cuba. Further, it should provide insights as to what American interests and groups might have been involved in dealings with Cuba and should suggest what issues might have arisen from them.

Examination of the leadership of United States public opinion should define issues which emanated from the policy elites, should define the policy group involved, and should suggest dynamics of the group. It should also reflect trends in United States national style.

The measure of public opinion should further define issues related to United States dealings with Cuba and should suggest the amount and kind of public participation in the policy group. It may also reflect national morale and national style

Finally, examination of the activities of the policy group should reveal the dynamics of the group and the issue as redefined by the group. In accordance with the hypothesis of national will presented in Chapter 1, the dynamics of the group so revealed should suggest the kind of policy formulated and enacted, which then became the national will of the United States.

In viewing the case from the four perspectives described, the emphasis is on those factors which are a part of the group dynamic hypothesis of national will. Although some of the material presented can undoubtedly be used to describe aspects of the previous concept of national will, the author is not aware of any studies which apply that concept to the cases to be examined here.

History

Robert F. Smith makes an excellent case for viewing the history of United States-Cuban relations from 1917 until 1960 as having been driven primarily by United States business interests.¹ The Platt Amendment to the United States military appropriations bill of 1901-02 provided for United States military intervention in Cuba as required to

¹Robert F. Smith, The United States and Cuba: Business and Diplomacy, 1917-1960 (New York: Bookman Associates, 1960), p. 11.

protect United States interests. In fact, United States troops were sent to Cuba in 1917 to help quell revolts. A base for U.S. Marines at Guantanamo was obtained and the forces were gradually built up. In 1923, a Mr. Lakin, an executive of the American-owned Cuba Company in Cuba, stated publicly that the mission of the marines in Cuba was "anti-Bolshevik." He said that the "Bolsheviks," when active in Cuba, "tended to destroy property."²

Also in 1923, the United States appointed its first Ambassador to Cuba, General Enoch Crowder, who pursued a policy of interference in the internal affairs of Cuba. That his interests were keyed toward United States business is evidenced by his successful effort to have United States banks in Cuba backed by the U.S. Federal Reserve System, which was probably contrary to Federal law.³ This action provided United States banks with a competitive advantage over their Canadian counterparts.

In general, United States policy in the period before 1933 was directed toward providing a stable atmosphere in which the United States might conduct its business in Cuba without much regard for either the kind of government Cuba had or the condition of its people. This attitude is perhaps best expressed by the State Department memorandum of 1924 which said that the Cubans should work out

some solution which gives promise of affording a period of stability even though it should not fall in with our ideas of a republican

²Ibid., p. 105.

³Ibid., p. 96.

democratic constitutional government and even should it not be in accordance with their own Constitution.⁴

United States military intervention, then, was reserved for control of disturbances which would prejudice the conduct of United States business or threaten United States-owned property. It was not to be used to guarantee democratic government or the public welfare.

This threat of American military interference was upsetting to Cubans, and each succeeding Cuban Government made efforts to get the United States to abrogate the Platt Amendment. Finally, on 19 May 1933, the United States concluded a treaty with Cuba in which the base at Guantanamo was retained, but the Platt Amendment was revoked. This action was seen as a measure designed to lend prestige and support to a new Cuban Government which had come to power under the Cuban Army of which Colonel Fulgencio Batista was Chief of Staff. In fact, the U.S. State Department and many business interests had considered the Platt Amendment obsolete for some time anyway.⁵

Colonel Batista remained a power in Cuba until Castro ousted him in 1959, although he did not actually assume primacy as dictator until 10 March 1952. The United States relations with Batista and his government were good. During the two years of rebellion, the Eisenhower Administration openly sympathized with Batista, and the dictator found asylum in the United States after he was overthrown.⁶ Also, although

⁴Ibid., p. 104.

⁵Ibid., pp. 120, 127, & 153.

⁶Karl E. Meyer and Tad Szulc, The Cuban Invasion (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 13.

the United States placed an embargo on the shipment of arms to Cuba on 15 March 1958, in recognition that a civil war was in progress there, a U.S. Military Mission was stationed in Havana to train Batista's troops.⁷ This United States support for Batista continued in spite of the record of repression, torture, and atrocity his regime had established and in spite of the fact that the Cuban people continued to live in poverty.

In summary, then, until Castro took power in Cuba on 1 January 1959, American concern for Cuba after the Spanish-American War was primarily vested in business interest groups and mediated through the State Department and the United States military. The goal was to provide security for United States business, trade, and property.

From 1 January 1959 until the invasion of Cuba on 17 April 1961, the issues fluctuated. Initial concern about a "blood bath" of reprisals against Batistianos in Cuba was raised by Senator Wayne Morse and Congressmen Hays and Celler in January 1959. They asked the Administration to "publicly express horror" in the United Nations.⁹ Apparently there was little public or Administration response to this and the issue subsided.

The issue of Castro's link with Communism arose, and during his visit to the United States he was asked about the connection when he appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He denied any

⁷Ibid., p. 29.

⁸Ibid., p. 32; and Smith, pp. 175 & 179.

⁹Meyer and Szulc, p. 32.

connection. However, on 14 February 1960, Cuba signed a trade agreement with the USSR and the U.S. State Department viewed the pact as evidence of a shift in Cuban relations with Russia.¹⁰ The text of the Cuban Revolutionary Council's statement was published in the New York Times 9 April 1961. In it, the anti-Castro forces in exile in the United States stated among the betrayals listed was that of turning Cuban schools into "centers of Communist indoctrination."¹¹ During his campaign for the Presidency, Richard Nixon stated that Cuba was being aligned with the Communist bloc and referred to it as the "Communist-Cuban" regime.¹²

A related issue of anti-Americanism in Cuba arose also. On May Day 1960, Castro told a large crowd that the United States was preparing an invasion of Cuba, and his supporters burst out with, "Cuba Si, Yankee No," for the first time.¹³ That chant would be heard many times again.

Perhaps the most enduring issue, however, and the one that raised the most interest in the United States, was the old issue of United States business in Cuba. In October 1959, the U.S. State Department sent a note to Castro warning him of problems which were developing in relation to his seizure of American sugar properties. On 29 November Senator Ellender of the Agriculture Committee publicly warned that the United States might get back at Castro by slashing his share of its

¹⁰Meyer and Szulc, pp. 35 & 42.

¹¹New York Times, 9 April 1961, p. 3:1.

¹²Meyer and Szulc, pp. 65 & 67.

¹³Meyer and Szulc, p. 47.

sugar market. On 13 March 1960, Cuba seized three United States sugar mills. By the end of 1960, more than one billion dollars in United States property had been seized. The question of the Sugar Law came up often in Congress, and the Administration asked for changes that would permit Administration control of allocations. Congress finally approved that change on 5 July 1960, and President Eisenhower signed the bill into law and withdrew all of the remaining Cuban sugar quota for the year. On 19 October 1960, the Administration announced a sweeping embargo on United States trade with Cuba.¹⁴

The possibility of a direct United States military invasion of Cuba was an issue Castro himself raised through his delegation at the United Nations General Assembly. On 19 October 1960, the Cubans notified the United Nations that they expected "a large scale invasion" to be mounted within a few days.¹⁵ Castro had previously complained frequently in public of aircraft flying out of United States bases which had bombed and strafed Cuba. As late as 5 April 1961, Castro's Foreign Minister, Raul Roa, asserted that the United States was supporting a "so-called invasion army of 4,000 to 5,000 counter-revolutionaries, mercenaries and adventurers" to fight against Cuba."¹⁶

¹⁴Meyer and Szulc, pp. 40, 57, 62, & 67.

¹⁵Meyer and Szulc, p. 68.

¹⁶New York Times, 6 April 1961, p. 1:8.

Leadership of Opinion

President Kennedy consistently denied the charges of a planned United States invasion of Cuba. On 12 April 1961, while responding to questions of press representatives, President Kennedy said the Government would do everything possible "to make sure that there are no Americans involved in any [anti-Castro] actions inside Cuba."¹⁷ These statements were made only five days before just such an offensive, supported by American ships and aircraft as well as American Navy frogmen, was in fact launched. Therefore, it appears the President was not attempting to muster public support for the action. Rather, he was apparently relying upon a hope that United States involvement in the action would not be discovered, or, if discovered, it could be plausibly denied or at least minimized.¹⁸

The President took this approach in spite of his much stronger position during the Presidential campaign of the previous fall. Though earlier in the campaign both Kennedy and his opponent, Vice-President Nixon, made moderate recommendations stressing international cooperation and avoidance of military action, they changed their approaches following the release of a Senate Internal Security Subcommittee report on 10 September 1960. This report charged that Cuba had been given to the Communists the way China was. It raised the issue of blame for the

¹⁷New York Times, 13 April 1961, p. 1:1.

¹⁸Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962), p. 249.

"loss" of Cuba and opened the way for charges of being "soft" on Communism. Both candidates wanted to avoid such charges.¹⁹ In a public speech on 18 October 1960, Mr. Nixon lashed out against Cuba as an "intolerable cancer" and proposed that a number of steps be taken to "quarantine" Cuba. The following day, the Administration, clearly in support of the Vice-President's new position, imposed a sweeping embargo on United States trade with Cuba.²⁰

Kennedy responded on 19 October by saying the Administration action was "too little, too late" and placing the blame for the loss of Cuba on the Administration for failing to heed the warnings of its Ambassadors to Cuba. The Kennedy-Nixon television debate which followed showed Kennedy advocating more vigorous action and hinting at military intervention while Nixon opposed such ideas as reckless and in contravention to United States treaties with Latin America.²¹

Kennedy said no more about Cuba during the campaign. After his election the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) briefed him on its plan for the invasion of Cuba. Ironically, Nixon had in fact initiated that plan by a suggestion to President Eisenhower in the spring of 1959. The plan was secret, however; so, unless the President-elect was prepared to reveal that secret he was unlikely to discuss invasion again. In other words, President Kennedy did not attempt to garner public support for a United States invasion of Cuba.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 225.

²⁰ Meyer and Szulc, p. 67.

²¹ Meyer and Szulc, pp. 68-70.

Invasion remained an issue, however, as information about the preparation of a force of Cuban exiles became known. Despite official denial that the United States was training and equipping such a force at bases in Florida, Louisiana, and Guatemala, newspapers reported such activities until the time of the invasion. The reporting was so complete that President Kennedy said to Press Secretary Pierre Salinger about a week before the invasion: "I can't believe what I'm reading! Castro doesn't need agents over here. All he has to do is read our papers. It's all laid out for him."²² Salinger believes he was purposely kept ignorant of discussions regarding the invasion plans so he could not be drawn into a dialogue with correspondents which might confirm their ideas about such plans.²³ Therefore, the public issue was not to be "invasion" and the press was not to be involved in the decision-making group.²⁴

The principal Administration effort toward molding public opinion about Cuba was the State Department's White Paper, a 36-page pamphlet published 3 April 1961. The text and a commentary on it were published in the New York Times 4 April 1961. The pamphlet was reportedly drafted under the President's close supervision. It raised the

²² Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1966), p. 146.

²³ Ibid., p. 145.

²⁴ For an excellent review of the press in the reporting of invasion preparation activities, see: Charles L. Cochran, Civil-Military Relations (New York: Free Press, 1974).

issue of Cuba's Communist affiliation, but, rather than labeling the regime Communist, it concentrated on Castro's failure to live up to his promises for a free and progressive government. It also raised the issue of his threat to export revolution to the Americas and called his regime a "fateful challenge to the inter-American system." Overall, however, it was an humanitarian document, emphasizing brotherhood among all American countries and admitting to past failures on the part of the United States in its relationship with Cuba. Finally, while it called upon Castro to return to his earlier goals for his country, it seemed to say that if he did not, the Cuban people would take the necessary action.²⁵

Whatever the issues this document was intended to address, the responses to it were primarily in terms of the expected invasion. Castro said it was tantamount to "undeclared war" and he prepared for an "invasion." Correspondents in Latin America reported that response to the White Paper was an increased fear of invasion. Rebel groups in Miami said the policy expressed in the White Paper did not mean they could not mount their invasion.²⁶ The White Paper pronouncement did not appear to stimulate interest in the moral issues it raised; rather, it intensified feelings on all sides of the invasion issue. It could be supposed that what the Administration intended was to keep up public

²⁵ New York Times, 4 April 1961, pp. 1:8 & 14:1.

²⁶ New York Times: 6 April 1961, p. 1:8; 9 April 1961, pp. 1:8 & 4:1; and 14 April 1961, p. 6:3-4.

interest in an invasion, but, if that were so, it seems some more effective effort to mold that interest might have been made.

A front-page editorial by James Reston published 11 April 1961 alleged that President Kennedy was receiving conflicting advice from his aides on the invasion plan. Reston maintained that the State Department was concerned about the "political and military consequences in the hemisphere and elsewhere of providing military forces to achieve military ends." He cited Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, which prohibits direct or indirect armed intervention by one signatory in the internal affairs of another. The United States had signed that charter in 1948.²⁷ The Administration, presumably because it was publicly opposed to military intervention anyway, had not publicly raised this ethical issue.

Reston developed the issue further in another editorial published the following day. He traced the history of United States interest in Cuba and went so far as to suggest that the United States should have annexed Cuba after the Spanish-American War. He pointed out that in spite of the "noisy jingoism" of the time, "the issues of right and wrong were debated in the Congress and in the country." Conversely, he asserted that even though President Kennedy and his advisors were discussing the question of Cuba "on an urgent basis," Congress was "not talking about it" and the press was "ignoring the moral aspects of the

²⁷New York Times, 11 April 1961, p. 1:8.

question."²⁸

Reston acknowledged the probable danger to American security posed by conditions in Cuba and even anticipated Cuban importation of offensive missile systems. However, he said that if the situation had become so bad that the Government was anticipating military action in spite of the ethical problems, "a government of laws should at least let the people know."²⁹

This one journalist, then, seemed to believe the Administration could have involved the public in the decision on Cuba, including even the difficult ethical issues, and still have made its decision to take military action, perhaps even without general public agreement. Nevertheless, it was clearly the intention of the Kennedy Administration not to do so prior to the invasion. Any public discussion was inspired by journalists and others not connected with the Administration.

Public Opinion

A paucity of information exists on public opinion about Cuba prior to the invasion. Only one Gallup poll relating to Cuba was reported in that time (see the appendix). This poll asked only whether the respondent thought Castro would be in power one year later. About one-half thought he would not. The question itself and the reply of those 49 per cent implied an awareness of some continuing struggle in

²⁸New York Times, 12 April 1961, p. 40:3 & 5.

²⁹New York Times, 12 April 1961, p. 40:5.

Cuba, but they gave no idea about the strength of opinion toward Castro and certainly no idea of public support for an invasion. The fact of only one Gallup poll on Cuba having been made suggests that Cuba was not a big issue.

Letters to publications revealed some public interest in Cuba. Smith reported that an Idaho beet farmer was moved to write the Wall Street Journal protesting proposed changes in the Sugar Act. He said the Act was good legislation which had provided stability in the sugar industry for twenty-five years and it was a shame to disrupt that because of frustration with Castro.³⁰ Also, a letter to the editor of the New York Times from two professors of political science was generally critical of United States pressure on Cuba as counterproductive.³¹

Overall, the public notice of Cuba prior to the invasion was generally of a low key. It seems to have been confined to special interests.

Activities of Policy Group

Irving Janis provides an excellent characterization of the Bay of Pigs invasion decision-making group and its dynamics. The group was an ad hoc advisory committee the President commissioned to study the project which had been presented to him on 17 November 1960.³²

³⁰Smith, p. 180.

³¹New York Times, 12 April 1961, p. 40:3 & 5.

³²Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), pp. 14-49.

Allen Dulles, Chief of the CIA briefed President-elect Kennedy on the plan, and Kennedy told him to continue the planning. Dulles understood that he had not been told to implement the plan and that Kennedy was not committed to it at that time. Dulles referred the plan to the Special Group of the CIA and it continued to develop. It became a major invasion plan rather than a guerilla infiltration and therefore it began to involve a major United States commitment. Also, leadership of the Cuban Brigade eventually came to be firmly under CIA control.³³

In this way a plan originated by the former Vice-President, probably with the protection of United States business interests in mind, became the province of a paramilitary CIA group. Richard Bissell, Deputy Director of the CIA, and his boss, Allen Dulles, represented the CIA within the decision-making group. Those two, especially Bissell, who was well-known to Kennedy, dominated the group's sessions.

Dulles and Bissell were holdovers from the previous Administration and had the voice of authority for the still-unorganized new group. Also, they were experts in a specialized field. Another such member of the group was General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who also gave his approval to the plan. These authorities strongly influenced the group and the President. Later, when the invasion failed, the President said: "All my life I've known better than to depend on the experts. How could I have been so stupid, to let

³³Schlesinger, pp. 233-37.

them go ahead?"³⁴

But the President did not just "let them go ahead." He, leading the ad hoc committee with a firm hand, produced a basic assumption group which rushed to form a consensus, excluded outside experts, and did not permit free exchange and dissent.³⁵ A striking example of this concerns Senator William Fulbright's attendance at the meeting of the group on 4 April 1961. The Senator had become alarmed at the press reports of an impending invasion and had sent a memorandum to Kennedy denouncing the plan with an eloquent argument. The President invited Fulbright to attend the 4 April meeting and permitted him to speak. Fulbright denounced the idea as "wildly out of proportion to the threat" and compromising of the moral position of the United States. Instead of inviting discussion or permitting response to the Senator, Kennedy simply continued around the table asking for approval or disapproval. He eventually fell into a tangential discussion with one member and the meeting broke up without even the completion of the straw vote. Nevertheless, this was the decisive meeting after which final approval to implement the plan was given.³⁶ It is significant that this was also the only time a member of Congress was brought in on the decision, and clearly Senator Fulbright was not permitted a full member's role.

The group, as measured by its interaction and the course of

³⁴Theodore C. Sorensen, Decision-Making in the White House (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 309.

³⁵Janis, pp. 35-49.

³⁶Schlesinger, pp. 251-52.

action it generated, gave evidence of being a basic assumption group mixed dependent and fight or flight (BaD/BaF). Initially the group turned in a dependent way to the guidance of the experts who had a ready-made script which might have been seen as an historical script, consistent with United States military actions in Cuba in 1893 and 1917. The President himself fostered this dependency through his direction of the group and other courses of action that were effectively excluded.

Additionally, the President and his group responded as if threatened by an outside force. Their own organization was as yet unformed (for example, Kennedy reportedly referred to the State Department as a "bowl of jelly"³⁷), but the opposition appeared strong. The campaign statements by Kennedy supporting a strong stand on Cuba could backfire if the Administration failed to carry through with this plan.³⁸ Also, the Cuban exiles were trained and presumably organized and now presented a "disposal problem."³⁹ They could cause trouble for the Administration if denied their revenge.

Also, Kennedy clearly felt pressed for time in his need for a solution to the Cuban problem. In a television interview just prior to the invasion he said with surprising candor, "If we don't move now, Mr. Castro may become a much greater danger than he is today."⁴⁰

³⁷Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1967), p. 34.

³⁸Sorensen, p. 297.

³⁹Schlesinger, p. 242.

⁴⁰Sorensen, p. 296.

In summary, then, the decision-making group came together with strong dependency needs which were met initially by two authoritative group members with a plan. In their need to insure group survival the group turned to those two and then to the official group leader who essentially coöpted the plan. As other issues of morality, practicality, and feasibility of the plan became identified with outsiders such as the press or Senator Fulbright, the group toughened in its resistance to such threats and became determined to fight. The public was never privy to the plan for reasons of security. Even when it became apparent the public did suspect, that issue was simply ignored. The result was a BaF group decision to launch an invasion of Cuba with a brigade of some fourteen hundred men, all anti-Castro exiles, led by CIA operatives and supported by the United States Air Force and Navy. Figure 4 is a schematic of the policy group's activities.

	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Membership</u>	<u>Dynamic</u>
prior to decision	1. protection of United States interests	1. Vice-President Nixon and CIA	BaF
	2. political defense	2. Ad Hoc Committee/CIA	BaD/BaF
at decision	3. need for urgent action	3. Ad Hoc Committee	BaF

Fig. 4.--Schematic of Policy Group's Activities
1961

Imposing the schematic on the model for national will demonstrates how issues changed and produced the invasion policy which became the national will without the direct participation of the public, the press, or Congress. The issue, protection of United States business interests in Cuba, arose in the operational environment of Vice-President Nixon. He was surely influenced by business interest groups (external influence) and his own thoughts about his upcoming campaign for, and possible accession to, the Presidency (internal influence).

As a good member of the Administration, Nixon communicated the issue to President Eisenhower, who turned to the CIA. At that point the group involved was an elite consisting primarily of the Vice-President and members of the CIA.

However, as the Presidential campaign proceeded, the issue became a part of public debate and, as such, involved at least the leadership of the Democratic Party, an interest group. This generated a new issue which was something like: "What will be done in Cuba?" This new group and new issue changed the operational environment so that, once elected and briefed on the CIA plan, Kennedy was influenced by his own concern (internal influence) that his political opponents would accuse him of being soft on Cuba. Thus, the issue became one of political defense for the elite group of the Ad Hoc Committee and the CIA.

Although the public, the press, and the Congress generated issues connected with Cuba, none of these groups was empowered to enact a collective intent that would have been the national will. However,

the communication of the issues arising in those larger groups affected the elite group and changed the operational environment. The group felt pressured by the growing capability of the Cuban military (outside influence) and its own perception that the secrecy of its plan was threatened (inside influence), which indeed it was (outside influence). Thus the group composed of the same members, that is, having the same structure, became a different group dynamically. It became a BaF Group with a need for urgent action. That action was the CIA invasion of Cuba, which became the national will.

CHAPTER IV

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, 1962: MISSILE CRISIS

History

The four perspectives: history of the relationship between the United States and Cuba, leadership of opinion toward Cuba, measure of United States public opinion, and activities of the policy group can be applied to this second case.

The Cuban invasion was "a perfect failure."¹ The Cuban Brigade soon became stranded on the beach at the Bay of Pigs as the logistic support of the United States Navy was either destroyed or withdrawn. There was no popular uprising in support of the invasion, and the Brigade was confronted with a Castro army of twenty thousand men supported by artillery and air force. By the third day the fight was essentially over, although it took another five days for Castro to round up the insurgent survivors. In all, some twelve hundred invaders were taken prisoner.²

On the evening of the second day of the invasion, when it had become obvious that it would fail, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

¹Karl E. Meyer and Tad Szulc, The Cuban Invasion (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 146, citing Theodore Draper.

²Ibid., pp. 134-39.

Deputy Chief Richard Bissell made an appeal to the President for the commitment of the United States Air Force to save the invaders. General Lyman Lemnitzer and Admiral Amos Burke supported the request, but Secretary of State Dean Rusk pointed out that the President had pledged no direct United States involvement. The President refused the request.

United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson had been briefed on the CIA plan but was not fully informed despite the President's determination not to compromise him. He had said: "The integrity and credibility of Adlai Stevenson constitute one of our great national assets. I don't want anything to be done which might jeopardize that."³ As a result of his ignorance, Stevenson denied in the United Nations Castro's charges that airplanes which had bombed Cuban air fields 15 April 1961 in preparation for the invasion were in fact United States aircraft disguised to appear to be Castro's own. He also denied that the aircraft had flown out of Florida to the attack. Both facts were subsequently proved and Stevenson's credibility and American prestige suffered as a consequence.⁴

Stevenson was angry and let the President know it. Kennedy cancelled a planned second strike, which Stevenson did not know about, at least partly because of the Ambassador's reaction.⁵ Who caused this cancellation which might have aided the invasion (though surely not

³Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962), p. 271.

⁴Meyer & Szulc, pp. 123 & 134.

⁵Meyer & Szulc, p. 124.

saved it) later became a topic of controversy as some began to try to fix the blame for the failure.⁶

On 16 April 1961, after the air attack but prior to the invasion, Castro launched a diatribe against United States actions and described his revolution as socialistic for the first time. In the United Nations, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa stated that the United States had "exported war" to his country, which he likened to David standing heroically against Goliath. Despite Stevenson's technical arguments regarding the origin of the invasion, much of the world accepted Roa's view.⁷ On 19 April pro-Castro mobs were reported demonstrating in Panama, Argentina, Venezuela, Columbia, and Moscow, and editorial comments from Moscow, New Delhi, and London were also anti-American.⁸

More ominous, perhaps, was the official response from Moscow. In a letter to the President dated 18 April 1961, Premier Nikita Khrushchev placed the responsibility for the attack upon the United States and maintained that this responsibility was common knowledge. He further stated that the Soviet Union would "render the Cuban people and their Government all necessary assistance in beating back the armed attack on

⁶New York Times, 18 April 1961, p. 1:5.

⁷Meyer & Szulc, pp. 124 & 134.

⁸Meyer & Szulc, p. 133; and New York Times, 18 April 1961, pp. 16:7 & 17:1.

Cuba."⁹ Kennedy's reply denied direct United States involvement and shifted to the question of the struggle in Laos. What is important is the specter of Russian military support of Cuba raised by Khrushchev.

Failure to coordinate the invasion plans with the anti-Castro underground inside Cuba left them unprepared and exposed. A sweep of the island by Castro's security agents rounded up thousands of the underground and greatly weakened their influence in Cuba.¹⁰

In the eighteen months following the abortive invasion until the 16 October 1962 revelation of intercontinental missiles emplaced in Cuba, the Castro regime became more openly Communist. On 1 May 1961 Castro proclaimed Cuba "socialist" and banned elections. On 16 July 1961, the 26 de Julio Movement and the Communist Party of Cuba officially united to form one ruling party, the O.R.I. In a television speech on 2 December, Castro said he was a Marxist who would form an elite party to lead Cuba to a "People's Democracy."¹¹

The U.S. Department of State reported that \$60 million to \$100 million in Soviet arms to Cuba had turned the island into a "bridgehead of Sino-Soviet subversion." Later the Department of State said the Russians had stationed between three thousand and five thousand military personnel in Cuba.¹²

⁹New York Times, 18 April 1961, p. 1:5.

¹⁰Meyer & Szulc, p. 133.

¹¹New York Times, 3 December 1961, p. 1:2.

¹²New York Times: 4 January 1962, p. 1:8; and 24 August 1962,

On 1 February 1962 the Inter-American Foreign Ministers' Conference of the Organization of American States (OAS) voted to oust Cuba and suspend any arms trade with her. An abstention by Argentina was reversed when she also broke relations with Cuba on 9 February.¹³

As early as August 1961 President Kennedy had begun talking about using the Trading with the Enemy Act to stop all United States trade with Cuba. However, in each public mention of the issue, he discussed his reluctance to impose hardship on the Cuban people. Finally, on 3 February 1962, Kennedy announced a near-total embargo on trade with Cuba. He exempted only medicine and some food.¹⁴

Leadership of Opinion

The buildup to the eventual embargo was typical of Kennedy's efforts following the invasion to move public opinion to acceptance of his proposed measures. By carefully separating moral issues from pragmatic ones, he proceeded with his plan to bring economic pressure to bear on Castro. There was some reaction to the embargo as nineteen citizens wrote the President to say they would defy it.¹⁵ Others, including Press Secretary Pierre Salinger, regretted the loss of Cuban

p. 6:6.

¹³New York Times: 1 February 1962, p. 2:2-6; and 9 February 1962, p. 1:7.

¹⁴New York Times, 4 February 1962, p. 1:5.

¹⁵New York Times, 4 February 1962, p. 23:4.

cigars, but overall reaction permitted Kennedy's course of action.¹⁶

Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion the President's main concern was to head off any public demand for further United States military action and, at the same time, to make certain that the Communists did not interpret his restraint as a sign of weakness.¹⁷ Therefore, in a major speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 20 April 1961, he explained this restraint as being required by international law but further stated, "Let the record show that our restraint is not inexhaustible." This implied threat was followed by his statement that a policy of "non-interference" was not a policy of "non-action" and that, in regard to "outside Communist penetration," this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are the security of our nation [emphasis added]." Following on in the same tone, the President invoked a vision of Russia as the invader "whose character was stamped for all time on the bloody streets of Budapest." He spoke of traditional American resistance to tyranny and hinted that there would eventually be more action on this matter. He said that the security of all American nations was in danger and that together with Latin America the United States must face "the real issue of survival of freedom in this hemisphere itself."¹⁸

¹⁶ Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1966), p. 251.

¹⁷ Schlesinger, p. 287.

¹⁸ New York Times, 21 April 1961, p. 2:2.

Understanding that the President's message was intended for the general public of the United States and the world at large, one can see he was taking a strong stand as leader of a dependent basic assumption group with an appeal to an historical script, i.e., America's tradition of resisting tyranny and supporting the oppressed. He had, at the same time, shifted the issue to national security, an issue which tends to produce a fight or flight response and a BaF group dynamic. Conspicuously absent from the discourse is any mention of risks of direct action in terms of further loss of prestige or war with the Soviets, themes which would have suggested the leader was not in complete control and might have encouraged speculation rather than unanimity. Also, the message, with its new issue of hemispheric security, tended to broaden the group to include Latin America. In view of the adverse Latin American response to the invasion, such a move was important.

Response to the speech, though generally favorable in the West, was variable and demonstrated that the larger group, i.e., the public at large, was not bound by an "effective machinery of intercommunication" which can exist in a smaller group (see page 38 above). Although a convention of publishers in New York City reported a public "consensus" supporting Kennedy's "firm stand" in his speech, a survey of editorial opinion published 22 April 1961 revealed a wide range of reaction and much speculation about blockade of military intervention. Furthermore, students in Mexico City marched in protest against the Kennedy stand.¹⁹

¹⁹ New York Times: 22 April 1961, p. 4:1 & 3; and 24 April 1961,

The next effort in leadership of opinion following the Bay of Pigs was to protect the Administration from partisan attack.²⁰ To this end the President contacted many Republican leaders. This effort was largely successful in that many leaders called for bipartisan support of the Administration in time of national crisis. The support was not universal or consistent, however, and Richard Nixon, Barry Goldwater, and others occasionally attacked the Administration on the failure of the invasion, the "irresolution" toward Cuba, and the "blackmail" of the Castro offer to release the prisoners in exchange for tractors.²¹ The latter plan was unofficially supported by the Administration.

President Kennedy tried to put an end to the witch-hunting. First, on 21 April 1961, he took sole responsibility for the invasion. Then, an official White House statement on 24 April said: "The President is strongly opposed to anyone within or without the Administration attempting to shift the responsibility."²² The second effort was the more successful, and former President Eisenhower publicly supported Kennedy's stand. Also, Senator Everett Dirksen opposed a proposed congressional investigation of the CIA's role in the invasion.²³ It has

p. 1:3.

²⁰Schlesinger, p. 288.

²¹New York Times: 10 May 1961, p. 1:6; 25 May 1961, p. 1:1; and 17 October 1962, p. 1:1.

²²Schlesinger, p. 290.

²³New York Times: 2 May 1961, p. 1:5; and 4 May 1961, p. 11:1.

been suggested that the Republicans had no wish to have their role in the plan's inception exposed.²⁴ Their group issue was defense against an outside threat (BaF) more than non-partisan cooperation.

As time passed the Administration became more involved with issues relating to Berlin, Laos, and a nuclear test ban treaty than with Cuba. All were issues that brought the United States into direct confrontation with the Soviet Union even without the issue of Cuba. In June 1961, Kennedy admitted to Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna that the invasion was a misjudgment on his part.²⁵ However, he defended the subsequent economic sanctions against Cuba not as a response to the elimination of United States business interests in Cuba but as a necessary response to a direct threat to democratic governments in Latin America.²⁶ This theme became well established between Kennedy and Khrushchev, and the latter took pains to reassure Kennedy that Cuba posed no military threat to the United States. He continued to do this through his spokesmen until right after the United States discovered the missiles on Cuba.²⁷ As a result, an issue of Russian deceit and betrayal arose when the missiles were discovered.

In the meantime, the State Department pursued the Alliance for Progress, which was to provide economic aid and development for all

²⁴Theodore C. Sorensen, Decision-Making in the White House (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 288.

²⁵Ibid., p. 546.

²⁶Salinger, p. 179.

²⁷Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York: Norton and Co., 1969), p. 40; and Sorensen, p. 667.

Latin American countries except Cuba. Secretary of State Rusk announced on 5 May 1961 that the "real issue" in the Western Hemisphere was not the Sino-Soviet penetration but the battle against poverty. This was probably consistent with an Administration effort to turn public interest away from any more thoughts about direct intervention in Cuba, but such efforts may have been too intellectual to much affect public opinion. Ironically, in an editorial published on 12 May 1961, James Reston praised the President for not being turned from the "real issue," a nuclear test ban treaty.²⁸

In one respect Kennedy's efforts to mold public opinion was a decided failure. Probably as a result of his own frustration, he turned against the press and said their reports of the invasion preparations had greatly damaged the effort. In a talk with publishers on 27 April 1961, he asked that they censor news in the public interest.²⁹ Response was not favorable. Nixon said that Kennedy's request "demonstrated profound misunderstanding of the role of a free press opposed to that of a controlled press," and that it would encourage government officials to withhold information.³⁰ James Reston observed that the press had twice been used to give out false information during the invasion and that was

²⁸New York Times: 5 May 1961, p. 1:6; and 12 May 1961, p. 28:3-4.

²⁹Charles L. Cochran, Civil-Military Relations (New York: Free Press, 1974), pp. 163-64.

³⁰New York Times, 10 May 1961, p. 3:2.

debasing.³¹ This appears to be clear evidence of a symptom of a basic assumption fight or flight which identifies a specific group, the press, as the enemy and excludes it or attempts to use it as if it had no intrinsic value. Following the Cuban missile crisis, Press Secretary Salinger admitted that the news had once again been "managed."³²

Public Opinion

A review of Gallup public opinion polls for 1961 and 1962 revealed that Cuba had become a subject of interest for the poll-takers following the invasion (see the appendix). A lack of constant format in the questions made a longitudinal evaluation of the results difficult. However, the 5 May 1961 poll showed that 84 per cent of those polled had at least a "fair amount" of interest in the subject of Cuba. Assuming interest and attention concerning Cuba remained high for the following month, the poll published 7 June 1961 might indicate that the public had been affected by the President's speeches. Opinion was split on United States indirect support of anti-Castro forces; but, it was heavily against direct military intervention (65 per cent). That opinion prevailed through October 1962 despite a newspaper poll published 5 October 1962 which asserted that most citizens wanted the United States to "do something."³³

³¹ New York Times, 10 May 1961, p. 44:3.

³² New York Times, 31 October 1962, p. 1:8.

³³ New York Times, 5 October 1962, p. 14:1-3.

Further, the Gallup poll for 7 June 1961 showed 63 per cent favoring an embargo. Although Kennedy had not yet publicly discussed embargo, he did enact one eight months later. Perhaps his efforts to lead up gradually to an embargo were unnecessary as far as United States public opinion was concerned. By 14 October 1962, however, just prior to the missile crisis, embargo no longer seemed the primary tool for action in Cuba for those polled, and opinion was spread widely over the choices, with "do something short of actual war" gaining 26 per cent. (See the appendix.)

By 17 October 1962, about 50 per cent of the people thought United States military intervention with troops would result in all-out war with Russia, while 37 per cent did not think war would result. Neither of these groups, however, thought troops should be sent. (See the appendix.) This suggests that Administration efforts to find non-military solutions to the Cuban threat were acceptable to the people and that fear of war alone did not deter Americans from demanding an invasion of Cuba.

Insofar as public opinion was a factor in the decision which followed the discovery of missiles in Cuba, it supported the Administration with the "tacit permissiveness of silence" referred to in Chapter I (page 17 above). On 13 September 1962 the President struck out at talk of war by saying that Cuba was no threat, but that the United States would quickly crush any threat if it arose.³⁴

³⁴New York Times, 14 September 1962, p. 12:1, 4, & 6.

Activities of Policy Group

About 9:00 a.m. on 16 October 1962, a Tuesday, President Kennedy called his brother Robert into his office and told him that U-2 flights over Cuba had just produced evidence that the Russians were emplacing offensive ballistic missiles and atomic weapons in Cuba.³⁵ At 11:45 a.m. that same day the CIA briefed a meeting of about fifteen men, including the President, who were to meet together daily for the next thirteen days, by which time the crisis was largely resolved.³⁶

The group of fifteen became known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOM). Five of the men were among those who had been part of the group which decided on the Bay of Pigs invasion. They were President Kennedy, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, and White House Foreign Policy Coordinator McGeorge Bundy. John McCone, who had replaced Allen Dulles as Director of the CIA, and General Maxwell Taylor, who had replaced General Lemnitzer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were new key members. Robert Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen had been close to the Bay of Pigs decision-making body, but they were full-time members of EXCOM. Vice-President Johnson was included in the group, and some others were frequently there.³⁷

³⁵ Kennedy, p. 23.

³⁶ Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), pp. 140

³⁷ Ibid.

The EXCOM deliberated largely in secret for five days. The President then made the decision to blockade Cuba. The press had been kept uninformed by dint of the mild subterfuge of a "cold" at first and then by a terse "no comment." However, once the decision was made public on 22 October, the Press Secretary was charged with maintaining "the President's communications with the people, no matter where he might be, and to halt the flow of all information that might prove useful to the enemy."³⁸

The Congress was also excluded from deliberations until just prior to the public announcement.³⁹ After the public announcement of blockade but before the proclamation which effected it, the OAS met and unanimously supported the action.

Despite the similarity in group membership and the fact that deliberations were in secret, the EXCOM performed in a much different way than the Bay of Pigs group. Janis's analysis of the EXCOM's action led him to conclude that it was largely functioning as a work group rather than a basic assumption group. He said that changes in the members' roles made each one act as a critical thinker and an occasional devil's advocate. In particular, Robert Kennedy and Sorensen challenged every premise, even at the risk of becoming unpopular.⁴⁰ No agenda was kept and the discussion was much more free-wheeling. The group broke into subgroups to consider alternatives and try them out on

³⁸Salinger, pp. 252 & 257-58.

³⁹Kennedy, p. 53.

⁴⁰Janis, pp. 140-66.

each other. Meetings were purposely held without the President, who wanted the members to be uninhibited. Outsiders such as Dean Acheson were brought in, and the President and others openly challenged the opinions of the military experts.⁴¹ Many of the operative changes were purposeful, the result of lessons learned from the Bay of Pigs.⁴²

The result of the EXCOM's decision-making was a plan to invoke a naval blockade of Cuba, to prohibit shipment of military materiel to the island as a first step in obtaining the removal of the offensive missiles. The decision included many plans for contingencies and "nothing, whether a weighty matter or small detail, was overlooked."⁴³ It was understood to be an incomplete decision which might require additional measures as the problem developed,⁴⁴ and yet the group expanded to involve the Congress and the public. Explicit discussion of moral issues included the desire to avoid deceitful actions and actions such as an airstrike which might kill thousands of innocent Cubans. Although these concerns did not appear to be decisive issues, they were raised and the decision made was compatible with them.⁴⁵

On 13 September President Kennedy had vowed to take action to crush any Cuban threat. Leading Republicans such as Senators Goldwater, Keating, and Capehart had been publicly speaking out for stronger action against Cuba, and Senator Capehart had claimed proof of offensive

⁴¹Kennedy, pp. 31, 33, 36, & 45.

⁴²Schlesinger, pp. 296-97.

⁴³Kennedy, p. 60.

⁴⁴Kennedy, p. 55; and Salinger, p. 263.

⁴⁵Janis, pp. 157-58.

missiles in Cuba in August.⁴⁶ Perhaps these circumstances led the President to make his initial decision that some coercive action must be taken and that the United Nations could not be utilized.⁴⁷ This effectively limited the considerations of the EXCOM from the outset and can be viewed as evidence of a BaF group. The group to be defended was Kennedy and his political allies being assaulted by Republicans. On another level, the group was the United States and then the OAS against the Soviets and, to some degree, since the United Nations was side-stepped, the rest of the world. The decision to blockade is certainly compatible with the "fight" decision of a BaF.

In this kind of case, however, a more vigorous response, an airstrike or an invasion, might be expected from a BaF. The congressional group made such a demand when it was briefed on 22 October. Shocked and angry at having been betrayed by the Russians, they pressured the President for such a decision. He, however, was able to recognize the source of their response and knew it to be much like his own before days of deliberating had changed his ideas.⁴⁸

The President's address of 22 October 1962 was replete with the themes of a basic assumption group. The overall tenor of it, however, was of a strong leader informing his group of his intentions. In fact, he characterized the speech as a "report in fullest detail."⁴⁹ He said

⁴⁶ Janis, p. 142; and New York Times, 29 August 1962, p. 1.

⁴⁷ Kennedy, p. 33. ⁴⁸ Kennedy, pp. 53-55.

⁴⁹ Kennedy, p. 163 & pp. 163-71 for the complete text.

that the United States could not tolerate "deliberate deception" or "offensive threats" by other nations, thus raising the threat theme of a BaF. Given the recent deception and offensive action of the United States toward Cuba, this could not be seen as simply American national character or even the quid pro quo of a fair man, but rather as a response to a perceived threat. He further defined the group to be defended by referring to the "special historical relationship" of Cuba to the Western Hemisphere. He built on the dependent theme by speaking of the United States as a "powerful nation which leads a worldwide alliance." Then he spoke again of the threat to "hemispheric security" and threatened a "full retaliatory response" upon the Soviet Union in the event of attack by Cuban missiles on "any nation in the Western Hemisphere." It is doubtful that any nation but the United States was targeted by Cuban missiles, but Kennedy wanted OAS support of the blockade. He hoped his effort might produce a BaF group within the OAS, which, to the surprise of Robert Kennedy, did indeed give unanimous approval to the blockade.⁵⁰

After some calm discussion of plans and goals which might be viewed as an offer to involve the attentive public in a work group effort toward the longer-term resolution of worldwide problems, the President finally again invoked American tradition and the threat. He said: "The cost of freedom is always high but Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of

⁵⁰Kennedy, p. 57.

surrender or submission."⁵¹ These are BaD and BaF themes.

The EXCOM continued to function until agreement was reached on 28 October that the Soviets would remove their missiles. Pressure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give up on the blockade and attempt an airstrike was resisted.⁵² Confusing responses from the Soviets were calmly analyzed and good decisions were made, including the one contracting the blockade to allow more time for the positive Soviet response which finally came.⁵³

Public opinion certainly did not prevent Kennedy from pursuing his chosen course in this matter. The Navy moved on his command and the Army and the Marines did likewise. The press, based upon spot interviews, generally proclaimed the public support for Kennedy's action although even then it reported widespread fear of the consequences.⁵⁴ On 26 October a "bellicose mood" was reported from the Midwest, with a sentiment for "cleaning up Cuba."⁵⁵

Bipartisan congressional support prevailed, and Eisenhower urged "unity" in the nation's time of crisis. Most campaigning ceased for the duration, and Senator Vance Hartke criticized Eisenhower by saying he should stop campaigning because of his "implied criticism" of Kennedy's

⁵¹Kennedy, p. 171.

⁵²Kennedy, p. 97.

⁵³Kennedy, pp. 85-104.

⁵⁴New York Times: 23 October 1962, p. 21:4; and 24 October 1962, p. 26:1, 2, & 6.

⁵⁵New York Times, 27 October 1962, p. 7:3.

action.⁵⁶ For Hartke even bipartisanship could become a BaF theme.

A review of editorial comments published 24 October was almost universally in support of Kennedy's position. All interpreted it as a tough stance; most mentioned the possibility of war. Some felt such a move should have been made earlier.⁵⁷ Overall, the editorials echoed the BaF theme.

Finally, followup Gallup polls published 22 March 1963 and 1 May 1963 (see the appendix) gave no evidence of the prevailing issues or themes in the public attitude toward Cuba. However, they suggested a possible return to the "tacit permissiveness of silence" observed earlier.

A schematic of the group activity in the missile crisis case, Figure 5, is more complicated than in the invasion case (page 57 above). In this case, direct military action became the expression of national will despite the fact that a drastic recent failure of direct military action, the Bay of Pigs invasion, had been experienced. Applying the schematic to the model demonstrates how this came about.

President Kennedy, through skilful leadership of opinion among his fellow politicians and in the public arena, developed the issues of political defense and national security. Among themselves, the politicians took a policy of bipartisanship as the way to defend against the

⁵⁶ New York Times: 29 October 1962, p. 1:1; and 31 October 1962, pp. 7:1 & 14:6.

⁵⁷ New York Times, 24 October 1962, p. 26:1.

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Membership</u>	<u>Dynamic</u>
Post-invasion		
1. political defense national security	bipartisan political leadership	BaF
2. moral (international responsibility)	State Department ?public	BaD/BaF
Missiles discovered		
3. national security political defense	President/?CIA	BaF/BaD
Decision-making		
4. political defense? best course of action	Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOM)	BaF? Work Group
5. threat	Congress	BaF
6. threat/moral	President and public	BaF/BaD
7. best course of action	EXCOM	Work Group

Fig. 5.--Schematic of Policy Group's Activities
1962

effects of the failure of the invasion. As the public became involved, thus expanding the group, the issue became one of national security, which caused the larger group to band together in common defense to support its leader, the President. This reflected the action of a BaF group.

Had this continued for long, however, the public might have forced a fighting action upon its leader. Therefore, the issue was changed by design from within the elite group. The State Department (and eventually the press and others) began communicating to the public as a group the issues of American moral responsibility for the welfare of Latin America and the establishment of international peace. This changed the operational environment to permit development of the Alliance for Progress and arms limitation talks. These were activities of the elite leadership operating from an historical script. In that setting, the public became a part of a dependent basic assumption group.

Discovery of the missiles in Cuba changed once again the operational environment by posing an aggressive threat (external influence). Also, the discovery affected the operational environment through the President's perception that he would have to act to avoid political censure because of his strong public statements about such a threat (internal influence). A group of elites was formed, the Executive Committee, which operated initially under these two issues, national security and political defense, to form a BaD/BaF.

As the group developed its intercommunication and began to

receive additional input from various experts and outside influences, it moved toward functioning primarily as a work group whose issue was the search for the best course of action.

When the President expanded the group by bringing in members of Congress for a briefing, that larger group defined the issue again in terms of the Communist threat, with emphasis upon Communist deceit and betrayal. This larger group was clearly a BaF group. Had it been empowered to enact the national will, it would probably have mounted an airstrike and full-scale invasion of Cuba. That group neither controlled the resources nor had authorization since the President retained leadership in the matter, so an invasion was not mounted.

The President then involved the general public with his television speech. As discussed above, this speech developed themes which brought the public into a basic assumption group dependent mixed with fight or flight. The President and his elites, which included the military leadership, controlled the resources to enact the national will, a naval blockade. Therefore, only the tacit permissiveness of silence was required of the general public, and this was obtained from it by developing the issues which placed it in a BaD/BaF dynamic.

President Kennedy returned to work with his Executive Committee after employing the blockade. Within that group, the issue remained the search for the best course of action, and the group continued to function as a work group.

Thus the actions which expressed the national will of the United

States toward Cuba during the missile crisis were the product of an elite group operating essentially as a work group. Insofar as the public was involved, it operated as a BaD/BaF group.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

In Chapter I, current concepts of national will were found lacking because they failed to explain the question implied in the preface, namely: How does public opinion become translated into national policy as it is enacted? This study suggests that this failure results from not incorporating an understanding of dynamic political decision-making into the concept of national will and from the persistent treatment of public opinion as a kind of natural resource which can be tapped like an oil well to provide the energy to drive the national will.

Examination of current understanding of public opinion in this study revealed that such understanding is incomplete. Also, methodology for assessing public opinion, though much refined over the last forty years, has served largely to expose more areas of incomplete understanding and inadequate methodology. Nevertheless, enough is known about public opinion to say that it is not a monolithic well of energy and that, even if it were, its potential could not be accurately measured.

Inasmuch as public opinion does become a driving factor in the execution of national will, it is attached to a specific issue, narrowly defined. Therefore, public opinion shifts in its thrust and intensity

with subtle redefining of the issue. Also, as the issue changes, so does the part of the public concerned with it change.

Chapter II, then, defined a new model of national will which does incorporate the political decision-making process by utilizing a theory of group psychodynamics. The model also offered an explanation of how the group involved is formed as a result of the definition of the issue and the way in which that issue is communicated. Within certain conditions, the collective intent of that group becomes the national will.

Certain kinds of group dynamics were described which offer a framework within which to examine the case histories. The first case study demonstrated how the national will can evolve in a relatively small group, excluding the public at large and even the Congress of the United States. Also, it served to illustrate that a given issue, i.e., the proposed invasion of Cuba, could actually be perceived as several different issues which evolved with time and the change in membership of the decision-making group.

The second case studied illustrated the expression of national will which evolved again primarily from a small group working in secret. However, in the Cuban missile crisis, the Congress and the public at large were brought into the issue prior to the actual enactment of policy. In this case the President made an effort to mold public opinion toward a consensus which would support the decision he had already made. In this case, although the President controlled the resources to

enact his decision, he undoubtedly foresaw the possibility of a change in the situation which might necessitate making further commitments which would require broader support.

In both of these cases, the model proposed fit the information available and seemed to offer a useful explanation of the events. However, certain conditions bring the findings into question. First, although there are available abundant first-hand accounts of the activities of the decision-making groups in both cases, there is no running account of the temper of public opinion. In fact, the state-of-the-art limitations cited in the preface and above probably would have precluded input of the kind of ideal data desired, even if polling of public opinion had been extensive during the cases.

In addition, one can really only guess at the meaning of the issues communicated to the groups which received the communications. A statement made by the President may be said to be compatible with a particular group dynamic. However, it cannot be determined for certain from that alone whether the group is operating in that dynamic. A good observer might make a very accurate assessment if he could hear and see all verbal and non-verbal communications within the group, but with only the selected interactions reported available, he can only make a guess.

Finally, these are both cases which culminated in a definitive action. It may well be that national will as expressed in action by a recognized instrument of the nation, e.g., the Navy, has different characteristics from the national will of non-action. The capability of

the United States to endure some hardship rather than to take direct action might demonstrate a different national will. However, it seems that the model could fit such an example. One can postulate that the determination to endure would be typical of the basic assumption group "pairing" which assumes that the group will be preserved through the intervention of a new hope, be it a new leader or a technological breakthrough. The restraints of time have prevented the exploration of this problem through examination of an appropriate case history.

This work suggests areas worthy of further investigation. First, the establishment of base data on public opinion would be of great value to those who would understand the interaction of public opinion with policy leaders and issues. To establish a base requires further investigation of the methods of public opinion polling to evolve appropriate methods.

Against such a base one could compare the effects of attempts by officials to mold public opinion. Perhaps effective means of molding public opinion could be found by applying the psychodynamic theory to a prospective case study.

Further investigation of the kinds of group dynamics which operate is indicated. It may be that there are others which could be recognized. Also, it may be that some others than those described would better characterize the dynamics of the larger, more loosely formed group of the public at large, since those described were drawn primarily from small groups.

In summary, this effort has produced a model for national will which, when tested against two case studies, proved useful. Further study and testing of the model could result in practical concepts of value to the national policy-maker.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

GALLUP POLLS PERTAINING TO CUBA, 1961-1963

12 August 1960 (Interview Period: 16-21 July 1960)¹

Q6: What is your best guess--do you think Fidel Castro will be in power as leader of Cuba one year from now, or not?

Yes, will be: 21% No, will not: 49% No opinion: 30%

Compare with 10 May 1960 and 17 October 1962 (Q9d).

5 May 1961 (Interview Period: 28 April 1961 through 3 May 1961)²

Q3: How much interest would you say you have in the news of the situation in Cuba--a great deal, a fair amount, or hardly any?

Great deal: 44% Fair amount: 40% Hardly any, none: 16%

Compare with 7 July 1961.

10 May 1961 (Interview Period: 28 April 1961 through 3 May 1961)³

Q7: Suppose there were a free and honest election in Cuba today--do you think Castro would win, or not?

Yes: 14% No: 71% No opinion: 15%

Compare with 12 August 1960 and 17 October 1962 (Q9d).

¹George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-71 (New York: Random House, 1972), "Survey #631 KA," p. 1680.

²Ibid., "Survey #643-A," p. 1717.

³Ibid., "Survey #643-A," p. 1717.

7 June 1961 (Interview Period: 28 April 1961 through 3 May 1961)⁴

Q6b: Some people say that the United States should refuse to buy or sell products to Cuba so long as Castro is in power. Do you agree or disagree?

Agree: 63% Disagree: 23% No opinion: 14%

Compare with 14 October 1962 (Q20).

Q6c: Some people say that the United States should aid the anti-Castro forces with money and war materials. Do you agree or disagree?

Agree: 44% Disagree: 41% No opinion: 15%

Compare with 14 October 1962 (Q21a).

Q6d: Some people say that the United States should send our armed forces into Cuba to help overthrow Castro. Do you agree or disagree?

Agree: 24% Disagree: 65% No opinion: 11%

Compare with 14 October 1962 (Q21a).

7 July 1961 (Interview Period: 23-28 June 1961)⁵

Q6a: Do you favor or oppose the plan to exchange United States tractors for prisoners from the Cuban invasion?

Favor: 20% Oppose: 67% No opinion: 13%

Compare with 5 May 1961.

⁴Ibid., "Survey #643-A," p. 1721.

⁵Ibid., "Survey #647-K," p. 1725.

14 October 1962 (Interview Period: 20-25 September 1962)⁶

Q20: Taking everything into account, what action, if any, do you think the United States should take at this time in regard to Cuba?

Bomb, invade, belligerent action: 10%
 Trade embargo, starve them out: 13%
 Do something short of actual war: 26%
 Keep out, hands off: 22%
 Other action: 4%
 Don't know: 25%

Compare with 7 June 1961 (Q6b).

Q21a: Some people say that the United States should send our armed forces into Cuba to help overthrow Castro. Do you agree or disagree?

Agree: 24% Disagree: 63% No opinion: 13%

Compare with 7 June 1961 (Q6c and Q6d).

17 October 1962 (Interview Period: 20-25 September 1962)⁷

Q9a: If the United States sends troops to Cuba to try to overthrow Castro and the Communists, do you think this is or is not likely to bring about an all-out war between the United States and Russia?

Is likely: 51% Is not: 37% No opinion: 12%

Q9b: Those who think that an all-out war is likely if the United States sends troops to Cuba were asked: Do you think the United States should or should not invade Cuba?

Should: 19% Should not: 69% No opinion: 12%

Q9c: Those who think an all-out war is unlikely if the United States sends troops to Cuba were asked: Do you think the United States should or should not invade Cuba?

Should: 36% Should not: 57% No opinion: 7%

⁶Ibid., "Survey #663-K," pp. 1786-87.

⁷Ibid., "Survey #663-K," p. 1787.

17 October 1962 (Continued)

Q9d: Some people say that within the next two or three years the people of Cuba will overthrow Castro and the Communists. Do you think this is or is not likely to happen?

Is likely: 41% Is not: 43% No opinion: 16%

Compare with 12 August 1960 and 10 May 1961.

22 March 1963 (Interview Period: 8-13 March 1963)⁸

Q4a: In general, would you say that you are satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the Kennedy Administration has been handling the Cuba situation in recent weeks?

Satisfied: 52% Dissatisfied: 33% No opinion: 15%

Compare with 1 May 1963.

1 May 1963 (Interview Period: 4-9 April 1963)⁹

Q4a: In general, would you say that you are satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the Kennedy Administration has been handling the Cuba situation in recent weeks?

Satisfied: 49% Dissatisfied: 29% No opinion: 22%

Compare with 22 March 1963.

⁸Ibid., "Survey #669-K," p. 1810.

⁹Ibid., "Survey #670-KC," p. 1816.

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<u>Activity</u>	<u>Date/Comment</u>
Undergraduate Student Northwestern University Evanston, Illinois	September 1959 - June 1962 Biology Major. No Degree.
Tulane University School of Medicine New Orleans, Louisiana	September 1962 - May 1966 Degree: Doctor of Medicine Hawthorne Memorial Scholarship
Straight Medicine Internship Los Angeles County General Hospital, Unit II Los Angeles, California	July 1966 - July 1967 Outstanding Straight Medicine Intern
General Psychiatry Residency Tulane University School of Medicine Hospitals & Clinic New Orleans, Louisiana	July 1967 - July 1969
Career Resident Child Psychiatry Tulane University School of Medicine New Orleans, Louisiana	July 1969 - July 1971
Director Child Evaluation Program Womack Army Hospital Fort Bragg, North Carolina	July 1971 - June 1972 Subordinate staff included Ph.D. Psychologist and three Social Work/Psychology Technicians
Staff Psychiatrist JFKCENMA (Special Forces) Fort Bragg, North Carolina	June 1972 - March 1973 Consultant to General Command. Performed evaluations for security clearances.

Acting Center Surgeon
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

1 September 1972 - 30 October 1972
Consultant to General Command on
medical activities of Special
Forces worldwide

Student
Medical Officers' Basic Flight
Medicine Course
Fort Rucker, Alabama

13 March 1973 - 4 May 1973
Distinguished Graduate

Battalion Commander/Division
Surgeon
2d Med Bn, 2d Inf Div
Korea

15 June 1973 - 27 June 1974

Certified Diplomate
American Board of Psychiatry
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30 September 1974